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Abstract
This thesis studies how financial incentives affect women’s fertility timing decisions.
Each chapter investigates this question by looking at a policy that exogenously in-
creased fertility related financial incentives. The timing impacts of these policies are
estimated using a discrete-time proportional hazard model with unobserved hetero-
geneity.
In the first chapter, the impact of the 1999 UK Working Families Tax Credit
(WFTC) on the timing of birth is studied. This paper employs the 1991-2003 waves
of the British Household Panel Survey and identifies the policy impact of WFTC by
observing the change in the timing of birth using a difference in differences estimator.
The main finding of this paper suggests little evidence of changes in the timing of
all birth parity apart from first birth. Such a finding is likely to be explained
by the policy design of WFTC that increased not only the fertility but also the
labour supply incentives simultaneously. Moreover, a further analysis highlights the
importance of other policies, which also influenced women’s labour supply during
the period of study.
The second chapter, on the other hand, studies the impact of the 1977-2001 US
infertility health insurance mandates, which regulated the insurance companies to
cover for infertility treatment cost. Although the majority of the past literature
has studied impacts on older women who are likely to seek treatment, this paper
proposes that the mandates may have had a wider impact on the US population.
Specifically, it may have given an option for younger women to delay birth since
these policies reduced the opportunity cost of having a child in the future. The
chapter employs the 1980-2001 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Results suggest a
significant delay of 1-2 years in the time of first birth among highly educated white
women.
vii
Introduction
This thesis addresses a question regarding how financial incentives affect women’s
fertility timing decisions. To investigate this question, I study policies from the
United Kingdom and the United States. These policies each provide short and long
term incentives for the affected women to change when to have children. In the
previous empirical literature, the analysis mainly focused on how the probability of
birth changed in response to financial incentives. However, the observed change in
the birth rate does not necessarily reflect an increase in the completed fertility, but
may have been caused due to changes in the timing of birth. This thesis fills the gap
in the literature on financial incentives and fertility by presenting relatively scarce
evidence of the effect on the timing of birth.
In the first chapter of this thesis, the effect of the 1999 UK Working Families
Tax Credit (WFTC) on the timing of birth is studied. This policy was introduced
when the “New Labour” government took power as part of the attempt to make
work pay. It was an in-work tax credit given to low income households with children
when at least one parent was working more than 16 hours. The amount of tax credit
was contingent on the level of household income as well as the number of children
in the household. Although this policy was aiming to improve the labour market
participation of low income families, the eligibility condition requiring the presence
of children made the policy pronatalistic. The introduction of the policy, therefore,
may have had an unintended shortening impact on the birth intervals of the affected
families. This chapter uses a multiple-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model
with unobserved heterogeneity and identifies the policy impact of WFTC by observ-
ing the change in the timing of birth using a difference-in-differences estimator. The
data employed is the 1991-2003 British Household Panel Survey.
The second chapter, on the other hand, studies the impact of the US state-level
infertility health insurance mandates, which regulated health insurance providers
to cover infertility treatment cost. These state-level policies were introduced in 15
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states over the period of 1977 and 2001 with different degrees of generosity. These
mandates were introduced in order to help relieve the financial burden of infertile
women caused by the high treatment cost. These women with infertility problems
are typically aged above 35 and therefore these mandates primarily targeted the older
women. However, this chapter sheds light on an unintended effect among younger
women. US women, since the 1980s, are documented to have been struggling to
balance work and life (see for example Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee (1996), Phipps,
Burton, and Lethbridge (2001)). By making infertility treatment affordable, these
mandates relaxed the biological constraints that US women have been facing. As
a result, younger women who were planning when to have their first child may
have delayed birth to advance in their careers first. To study the potential delaying
effect, this chapter employs a single-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model
with unobserved heterogeneity and investigates the delaying effect of first birth by
a difference-in-differences estimator. The data from the 1980-1997 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics is used.
In contrast to the UK WFTC in the first chapter, which directly affected the
household income from the year 1999, the US infertility health insurance mandates
changed the women’s lifetime earning profiles. In other words, whilst the first chap-
ter focuses on the impact of a policy that immediately changed the household income,
the policy studied in the second chapter provides us with the rare opportunity to
investigate the effect of a policy that changed the income profile in a longer time
span. These two policies are also interesting as they each allow us to obtain un-
derstanding of the fertility timing responses among different demographic groups.
More specifically, the demographic group studied in the second chapter is a group
of highly educated women. This is in contrast to that in the first chapter, where the
affected women are typically those with low educational attainment.
At first, the theoretical literature analysed the fertility behaviour in a static
framework ignoring the stochastic element of fertility (Becker, 1960; Willis, 1973;
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Becker and Lewis, 1973). However, the later studies highlight the importance of
analysing fertility behaviour in a dynamic setting and studying the timing of birth
rather than completed fertility. Joseph Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997) list three
reasons why the dynamic setting is suited for the analysis of fertility. First, dynamic
analysis allows for the stochastic element of the fertility process to be directly mod-
elled. The uncertainties may arise partially due to the lifecycle household budget
constraint and partially due to the fact that neither contraception nor conceptions
are perfectly controllable. Second, under the static setting, the change in prices of
children or the level of household income only affects the number of children the
couples have. However, such changes may also influence the timing dimension of
fertility. In fact, the observed changes in the total fertility may have been driven by
the underlying changes in the timing of births. Third, fertility decisions are closely
related to women’s lifecycle labour supply as well as their human capital invest-
ment. The dynamic framework allows these elements to be explicitly modelled into
the analysis.
These dynamic theoretical models provide predictions for the impact of changes
in household income and women’s wages and assist in forming the core theoretical
predictions of the policy impacts investigated in this thesis.
For the purpose of studying the effect of changes in household income, the exist-
ing theoretical literature identifies two types of increase. The first type is when
household income increases permanently from period t onwards (e.g. Newman
(1988); Leung (1991)). The second case is when the household income profile be-
comes steeper over their lifecycle (Heckman and Willis, 1976). The former prediction
is particularly relevant for the analysis in the first chapter whilst the latter is likely
to help explain women’s behaviour in the second chapter.
In the first case, models predict that the increase in household income raises the
marginal utility of having children and thus leads to a larger expected family size.
The theory does not directly predict what happens to the timing of birth. However,
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if families are having more children overall, this should translate into shorter birth
intervals, since women are fertile for a limited period of their lives. The second type
of increase in the household income directly predicts the impact on the timing of
birth. In particular, Heckman and Willis (1976) argue that when the household
income profile increases over time, families delay birth in order to postpone child-
bearing until the environment is favourable. They assume that households cannot
borrow or save and this assumption is likely to be too restrictive. However, the
model discussed in Cigno and Ermisch (1989) and Cigno (1991) provides an addi-
tional delaying incentive of a steep earning profile. In their formulation, women’s
human capital accumulation process is explicitly incorporated. In such a framework,
women who face steeper earnings profiles delay birth, as women invest more to form
human capital in the early part of their lives.
On the other hand, models that allow for a stochastic fertility process give mixed
directions of the impact of changes in the wage level on the timing of birth. (e.g.
Heckman and Willis (1976); Wolpin (1984); Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985); New-
man (1988) ; Leung (1991)). Under this setting, couples control their fertility by
the use of contraception methods. On the one hand, the direct income effect leads
couples to reduce the level of contraception and have birth earlier. On the other
hand, the impact through the substitution effect is ambiguous depending on the
assumption regarding the relationship between children and mother’s leisure time.
If having children is assumed to be strongly complementary to consumption, an
increase in the wage leads women to shorten their time to birth. However, if having
children is complementary to leisure, the opposite effect is predicted.
These elements from the above analysis form the theoretical predictions in each
subsequent chapter. The mixture of the above effects generally gives us ambiguous
predictions of the impact of the policies and, thus, leaves the identification of the
policy impact to empirical investigations.
There are many studies that have looked at the impact of lump sum cash transfers
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on fertility. Moffitt (1997) summarises the US evidence from the 1970s and 1980s
whilst Gauthier (2007) reviews evidence from Canada and Europe. However, the
more relevant papers to the first chapter are those that investigate policies that
affected both the labour supply as well as fertility. This is because the UK WFTC
in the first chapter was an in-work cash transfer that also changed the labour supply
of the affected households. Women’s labour supply is an important factor that
determines their opportunity cost of maternal time. In the case of increasing female
labour supply, therefore, it is likely to deter women from entering motherhood or
having subsequent children. This implies that the sizes of the effects of WFTC are
likely to be smaller compared to those observed under the lump sum cash transfer
policies.
Previous literature on the impact of the UK WFTC investigates the impact
on fertility separately for single women (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007)
and for women in couples (Francesconi, Rainer, and Van Der Klaauw, 2009; Brewer,
Ratcliffe, and Smith, 2010). Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) and Francesconi
et al. (2009) use 1991-2001 British Household Panel Survey and identify the policy
impact by using a difference estimator. Brewer et al (2010), on the other hand,
use two repeated cross sectional datasets, the Family Resources Survey and the
Family Expenditure Survey. They employ a difference-in-differences estimator. For
single women, Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) find insignificant delaying
effects of WFTC for both the single women’s entry to motherhood and lone mother’s
probability of subsequent births. For women in couples the results are mixed. On
the one hand, Francesconi et al. (2009) show that the entry to motherhood and
mothers’ subsequent probability of birth both indicate insignificant delays. On the
other hand, Brewer et al. (2010) show that the probabilities of all birth parity
increased due to the introduction of WFTC and the impacts are particularly large
and significant for the first and third births. In addition, Brewer et al. (2010) show
that the affected women reduced the age at first birth, albeit insignificantly.
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Studies on similar policies also exist in the US. Papers by Duchovny (2001)
and Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003, 2009) all investigate the impact of the
increases in the amount of US Earned Income Tax Credit on fertility. The EITC is
also an in-work tax credit with similar features and eligibility conditions as those
of WFTC. The EITC went through several reforms, which increased the amount of
tax credit, and thus provided positive incentives to give birth. In all these papers,
repeated cross sectional data is used for the analysis. Duchovny (2001) uses the
1989-2000 March Current Population Survey and Baughman and Dickert-Conlin
(2003, 2009) employ the US birth certificate data between 1990 and 1999.
Results from these US studies are also mixed. For the impact on first birth,
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) find a negative effect on the birth rate for
white single women. They find positive impacts for all the other demographic groups.
However, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin(2009) report negative impacts of the EITC
reforms for all birth rates regardless of women’s race or marital status. The impacts
on the second birth estimated in Duchovny (2001) reveal positive impacts for non-
white single women and white married women. On the other hand, Baughman and
Dickert-Conlin (2009) show that only a very small positive effect is found for non-
white single women and all the other women experienced reductions in the birth
rates in response to the increase in the amount of EITC.
Finally, a recent Spanish study by Azmat and Gonza´lez (2010) looks at the
impact of the 2003 Spanish tax reform. By employing repeated cross sectional data,
Spanish Labour Force Survey, they identify the policy impact through the use of a
difference estimator with linear or quadratic trends. Their linear probability model
shows that the Spanish tax reform significantly increased the probability of first
birth and the second and subsequent birth also insignificantly increased.
Given the mixed results, it is crucial to further investigate the impact of WFTC
and the findings from the first chapter add complementary evidence to the exist-
ing literature. Compared to the above studies, the first chapter incorporates the
6
following three novel features simultaneously for the first time.
Firstly, this chapter presents detailed analysis on the impact of WFTC on the
timing of births using a multiple-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model with
unobserved heterogeneity. As discussed earlier, studying the timing dimension al-
lows us to enrich the existing literature that almost exclusively focuses on the impact
on the probability of birth. The timing effect is uncovered by calculating the proba-
bility of birth conditioning on not giving birth in the previous periods. This presents
a stark contrast to the probability of birth model employed in other papers, which
instead estimates the unconditional probability of birth. The hazard model em-
ployed in the first chapter makes it possible to study how the risk of birth changed
over time for a group of women under study. Whilst some papers investigate the
policy impact on the timing of birth by evaluating the change in the age at first
birth (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009) and Brewer et al (2010)), such a model
fails to take account of women who did not give birth. The exclusion of these right
censored observations from the age at first birth model is likely to bias the estimates.
The hazard model employed in this chapter, on the other hand, explicitly takes ac-
count of the censored observations in the specification. Moreover, compared to the
age at first birth model, the multiple-spell model with unobserved heterogeneity
allows us to study the impact on the timing of second and subsequent births whilst
taking account of potential correlations across birth intervals.
Secondly, unlike most of the previous studies, this chapter uses a panel dataset.
Although the generally larger sample size is a particularly attractive feature of re-
peated cross sectional data, these women are only observed once on an interview
day. As a result, the individual characteristics from the particular interview day
are often used for the analysis. In contrast, it is possible to follow the same set of
individuals when panel data is employed. Using this feature, demographic charac-
teristics prior to birth can also be observed. Since a birth is an outcome, which is
observed several years after the decision for conception is made, it is particularly
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important to control for demographic characteristics prior to each birth. Moreover,
the individual fertility history is easily uncovered and the correct birth parity for
each woman can be obtained. Given that the probability of birth is likely to differ
across parity, this ensures accurate selection of women for the analysis.
Thirdly and lastly, compared to some studies that use a difference estimator
(i.e. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Francesconi et al., 2009; Azmat and
Gonzalez, 2010), this chapter uses a difference-in-differences estimator. A difference
estimator identifies the policy impact by comparing the probabilities of birth before
and after the policy introduction. The identification strategy requires that there
are no underlying macro trends aside from the policy introduction itself. When
there are other trends, the estimated effect would also reflect such macro trends on
top of the policy effect. To control for this potential trends, these studies include
linear or quadratic trend terms. A difference-in-differences estimator employed in
the first chapter controls for the trend in a more flexible manner by using a group of
women, which shares similar characteristics but is not affected by the introduction
of WFTC.
Turning to the relevant literature for the second chapter, the majority of papers
looked at the impacts of the US infertility health insurance mandates among women
older than 35.
Schmidt (2005; 2007) investigate how the proportion of older women giving first
birth changed due to the introduction of the mandates by using a triple difference
estimator. To identify the policy impacts, she compares women aged above 35
to those who are younger, assuming that the younger women are unaffected by
the mandates. She argues that the improved accessibility of infertility treatments
may have increased the chance that older women give births. Using 1985-1999
Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and the Census Bureau, she finds that the
introduction of mandates increased older women’s first birth.
Bundorf, Henne and Baker(2007) investigate how the mandates affected the
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access to and the aggressiveness of Assited Reproductive Technologies (ART) by
studying the change in the probability of multiple birth. Using the 1981-1999 Vi-
tal Statistics Natality Birth Data and the 1989-2000 registry data from the Society
for Assisted Reproductive Technologies, they estimate the policy impact using a
difference-in-differences estimator. They conclude that the mandates increased the
utilization of ART, however the aggressiveness of the treatment did not change even
after the introduction of the mandates.
Bitler (2008), on the other hand, studies potential consequences of wider avail-
ability of infertility treatments. She looks at whether the mandates changed the rate
of multiple births and the child health outcomes. She finds no effect of mandates
on birth outcomes for young women aged below 30, but results show some negative
impacts on the birth outcomes of the twins and singletons among older women.
Whilst these past studies have focused on how the mandates affected an older
group of women, it is also possible that these state mandates influenced women
who were considering a potential use of treatment in the future. In other words,
the introduction of mandates may have encouraged younger women to delay giving
birth.
Buckles (2007) investigates whether women delayed births in response to these
policies. Using the 1982-1999 Current Population Survey, she first estimate how the
probability of first birth of older women aged between 35 and 44 changed before
and after the introduction of mandates using a difference-in-differences estimator
and finds that women residing in mandated states increased the first birth rate after
five years of coverage. She then runs a separate regression to see at how the birth
rates of younger women were affected. The estimates suggest that women aged
between 22 and 25 as well as 26 and 30 both decreased the birth rates after five
years of coverage. Bundolf et al. (2007) also devotes a small section to this issue
and presents similar difference-in-differences estimates which indicate that the birth
rate of women aged 25-29 decreased while it increased for women aged 35-39. Given
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these estimates, they conclude that there was a delaying of birth among younger
women.
The second chapter in this thesis makes several contributions to the existing
literature. Firstly, it provides additional evidence to Buckles (2007) and Bundolf et
al. (2007) by further analysing the impact of the mandates on the younger women’s
timing of birth. This is important, since studying such an unintended policy impact
allows us to comprehend the wider implications of a policy. In particular, the larger
proportion of women delaying birth potentially leads to increased risks of birth
complications among both mothers and children as such risks are strongly correlated
with the age of mothers. The analysis of the timing of birth also contributes to the
understanding of the previous results. If women in the mandated states were indeed
delaying their timing of birth, findings from Schmidt (2005; 2007) and Bundorf et
al. (2007) not only show increases in the number of first births due to more easily
accessible treatment but also reflect more women at older ages giving birth because
of their planned delay of birth. Moreover, the negative birth outcomes found among
older women in Bitler (2008) may have also been due to more women giving birth
at a later age. Studying the delaying effect is also interesting from the perspective
of the fertility literature as the mandates allow us to study how women respond to
changes in the long term earning profile.
Secondly, this thesis uses a single-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model
with unobserved heterogeneity, which is better suited for the studying of the timing
of birth. Buckles (2007) and Bundolf et al. (2007) make an implicit assumption
that the fertility behaviour of the older cohort of women is a good proxy for that
of the younger cohort of women in 10-20 years. Given that the women in the 1980s
and 1990s went through drastic changes in their life styles, such an assumption is
likely to be violated. The empirical specification used in the second chapter relaxes
such an assumption by instead following the same women over years to study the
delay of birth timing.
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Findings from this thesis suggest that a policy that changes household income
in the short term does have an impact on the timing of birth, although the size of
this effect is small, which at least partially is likely to be due to the positive impact
of the policy on the female labour supply. On the other hand, changes in the long-
term earning profile together with the effect of the policy to reduce the dilemma
between work and family seem to have a relatively large timing effect. In both
cases, the results reconfirm the importance of female labour supply in determining
the women’s fertility behaviour.
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1 Chapter One: Fertility timing response to fi-
nancial incentives: Evidence from the Working
Families Tax Credit in the UK
1.1 Introduction
The UK Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in October 1999,
replacing the former tax credit, Family Credit (FC). Its central aim was to increase
the returns generated from work for low income families with children. The two
tax credits were similar in structure, but WFTC was considerably more generous
compared to FC.
Although the structure of the tax credit was designed to encourage parents into
work, larger credit and childcare cost support may have had an unintentional impact
on the childbearing decisions of recipient families. The past literature primarily
looked at the impact of WFTC on female labour supply but there has been limited
research into how fertility behaviour has been influenced. An investigation of the
fertility response would, therefore, provide a better understanding of the full impact
of WFTC. Moreover, the labour supply analysis of WFTC typically assumes the
absence of a fertility effect. Given that female labour supply is likely to be jointly
determined with fertility, the reported labour supply effect may reflect not only the
direct impact of work incentives on female labour supply but also the indirect effect
of the changes in fertility.
There are several existing studies that investigated the fertility impact of policies
that affected both the income as well as the labour supply of the households. In
the UK, Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007), Francesconi, Rainer, and Van
Der Klaauw (2009) and Brewer, Ratcliffe, and Smith (2010) investigate the impact
of WFTC on fertility. There are also some US studies (Duchovny, 2001; Baughman
and Dickert-Conlin, 2003; Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2009) that look at the
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effect of the US Earned Income Tax Credit, which is a tax credit that is similar in
structure to WFTC. Lastly, Azmat and Gonza´lez (2010) investigate the impact of
the Spanish income tax reform.
This chapter contributes to the literature by incorporating all of the following
features simultaneously for the first time.
Firstly and most importantly, it provides a detailed analysis on the effect on
the timing of birth using a multiple-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model
with unobserved heterogeneity. Studying the timing effect is important because the
observed effect on the probability of birth does not necessary indicate changes in
the total fertility, but it may simply reflect changes in the timing of births. The
probability of birth model, which is often used in other papers, looks at uncondi-
tional probability of birth in each period whereas the hazard model estimates the
probability of birth in one period conditional on not giving births in the previous
periods. The former model typically looks at how the birth outcome for a particular
age group of women changes over time. However, under this framework, women
from different cohorts are compared over years. On the other hand, the latter for-
mulation allows us to study how the risk of birth changes over time for the same
group of women. Whilst some studies investigate the timing effect by looking at the
changes in the age at first birth, such a model typically ignores individuals who did
not give birth by the time they were interviewed. The hazard model employed in
this chapter explicitly incorporates such right censored observations into the spec-
ification. Additionally, the hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity allows us
to study the impact not only on the first birth but also on the subsequent births
taking account of potential correlations across birth intervals.
Secondly, the analysis in this chapter uses a panel data set, the 1991-2003 waves
of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is in contrast to the majority
of the previous studies that use repeated cross sectional data. Cross sectional data
only records children that were born before the interview date. By construction,
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therefore, the observed characteristics are collected after the births occurred. How-
ever, fertility decisions are typically made several years before the observed births.
As a result, it is important to control for characteristics prior to births. In addition,
the correct birth parity can be uncovered because panel data makes it possible to
obtain fertility histories of individuals.
Lastly, it identifies the policy impact by using a difference-in-differences esti-
mator. Compared to a difference estimator that controls for the macro trends by
including linear or quadratic terms, the difference-in-differences framework controls
for the trends in a more flexible manner.
It is worth noting that the UK saw several welfare policy reforms during the
period of focus. For example, the generosity of universal Child Benefit as well as
Income Support (IS) for unemployed couples and non-working lone parents with
young dependent children increased at the same time as the introduction of WFTC.
Moreover, labour market policies such as the national minimum wage and various
New Deal policies were also implemented to “make work pay”. Since the program
evaluation method cannot disentangle separate policy effects, the estimated impact
is likely to reflect not only the WFTC impact but also the effect from other policies.
Interpretation of the reported results, therefore, should be done with this fact in
mind.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background
information regarding WFTC and other policies introduced during this period. The
expected impact on the timing of birth is discussed in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 sum-
marizes the past empirical literature. Section 1.5 and 1.6 describe the identification
strategy and the econometric specifications while Section 1.7 discusses the data em-
ployed. Section 1.8 looks at the estimated results and further analysis is included
in Section 1.9. Finally, Section 1.10 concludes.
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1.2 Background information
1.2.1 The structure of Family Credit and the Working Families Tax
Credit
The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in October 1999 ap-
proximately 19 months after its announcement in March 1998, replacing the former
Family Credit (FC). WFTC was the main in-work tax benefit for families with
children in the UK until the April 2003 introductions of the two new tax credits,
Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. Since WFTC was preceded by FC, a
study of the policy impact requires comprehension of the structure of WFTC in
relation to FC.
Table 1.1 summarizes the eligibility conditions and each element of the two tax
credits. Both FC and WFTC were granted to parents of low income families in
which at least one parent was working 16 hours a week or more. The amount of
both tax credits was contingent on the number and the age of children in each
household as well as the level of household income. Additional credit was given to
those families if at least one parent was working longer than 30 hours. For both tax
credits, the maximum credits were given to families earning less than a threshold.
Once the level of household income reaches this threshold, the credit was reduced
at a specified rate.
Although these two tax credits had similar structures, WFTC was significantly
more generous than FC. The generosity of WFTC stems from four main compo-
nents. Compared to FC, the amount of maximum credit increased. Moreover, the
weekly income threshold for the entitlement of maximum credit was raised from £79
to £90. Additionally, the deduction rate of the tax credit was reduced from 70 to
55%. Lastly, WFTC provided more financial support towards the childcare cost.
The childcare cost subsidy was given to families if both parents were working more
than 16 hours a week. Under FC, childcare cost up to £60 was disregarded from
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the family’s income when the calculation was made. However, it was often criticized
since families with maximum tax credits did not attain additional support for their
childcare cost. WFTC, on the other hand, supported the cost more actively by pro-
viding subsidies for 70% of childcare cost. Moreover, the applicable age of children
was raised from 11 to 15.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of FC and WFTC. The initial difference in
the amount of tax credit is due to the larger amount of each element of WFTC
compared to FC. The threshold level was higher and deduction started later under
WFTC compared to FC. The slower rate of deduction under WFTC is reflected
in the less steep slope at the taper. The large jump in the amount of tax credits
around the level of £115.2 is due to the childcare cost subsidies. Finally, a smaller
jump seen around £170 is due to the additional awards given to families working 30
hours or more.
1.2.2 Other policies in the UK
Aside from the introduction of WFTC, the New Labour government also imple-
mented various policies targeting low income families. These policies are relevant
to the analysis in this chapter as they are likely to have also influenced the fertility
behaviour of WFTC individuals. Identifying separate policy effects is beyond the
scope of this chapter and, thus, the estimated results are likely to also reflect impacts
from these other policies. Brief explanations of relevant policies are given below and
the theoretical implications of these policies are discussed in Section 1.3.
The two reforms in 1999 that potentially reinforced the fertility incentives of
WFTC are the increases in the amounts of means tested Income Support and uni-
versal Child Benefit, although the magnitude of the effects from these policy intro-
ductions are marginal compared to that of WFTC. The main recipients of Income
Support are lone parents who are working less than 16 hours per week and with
savings less than £16,000. It is given to individuals who are aged between 16 and
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pension entitlement age. Child Benefit, on the other hand, is a flat rate cash transfer
which is paid per child. In 1999, the weekly amount of each of these benefits was
increased. For instance, the amount of Income Support for children aged between 0
and 10 increased in real terms by £2.50. On the other hand, Child Benefit for the
eldest child was also increased by £2.80 in real terms.
In addition, policies that are likely to have influenced women’s employment were
also implemented in 1998/1999. For example, New Deal policies for young peo-
ple, lone parents and individuals aged above 25 were implemented in 1998. The
New Deal for Young People is a mandatory program for individuals aged between
18 and 24 who claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance for 6 months. On the other hand,
New Deal for Lone Parents and 25 plus are voluntary program each targeting lone
parents claiming Income Support and individuals aged above 25 who have claimed
Jobseeker’s Allowance for 18 months or more. The main aim of these New Deals
is to assist the long-term unemployed to re-enter the labour market. On top of
these New Deal policies, the national minimum wage was also introduced on 1 April
1999, following the recommendations from the Low Pay Commission. This policy
particularly affected workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. The law sets
separate minimum wage rates for adults and youths aged between 18 and 21. In
1999, the adult rate was £3.60 per hour whereas the youth rate was set at £3.00
per hour. These amounts were increased again in 2000 to £3.70 and £3.20 per hour
for each group respectively.
1.3 Theoretical predictions
Assuming that WFTC was only a lump sum cash transfer that did not change
labour supply of the affected families, the expansion of the amount of credit is likely
to induce having an additional child earlier either to fulfill the eligibility condition
for WFTC by having first child or to claim a higher amount by giving subsequent
births.
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Potential implications of WFTC are somewhat more complex due to the re-
quirement of at least one member of the household to be in work. On the one hand,
the increase in the household income is likely to have reduced the employment in-
centives of individuals through the income effect. On the other hand, the higher
wage rates after WFTC are likely to have induced individuals to work longer hours
through the substitution effect. Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) ap-
plies a discrete choice structural approach on the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 Family
Resources Survey (FRS). Their simulation results suggest positive policy impacts
on lone mothers’ number of hours worked as well as their participation rate. They
also observed that the policy increased both the number of working hours and par-
ticipation of women with unemployed partners. On the other hand, women with
employed partners are estimated to have reduced their hours and participation rate.
Brewer, Duncan, Shephard, and Suarez (2006) also use a structural model of labor
supply using FRS data pre and post reform and find very similar results to those in
Blundell et al.(2000). Blundell, Brewer, and Shephard (2005) apply the difference-
in-differences estimator using FRS and the Labour Force Survey to carry out an
ex-post analysis. Their results suggest that lone mothers experienced a positive
employment effect while married mothers saw little change in their participation
rates. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) and Francesconi, Rainer, and Van
Der Klaauw (2009) each investigate the transition rate into and out of the employ-
ment among lone mothers and women with partners, respectively. They employ
the 1991-2001 BHPS and identify the policy impacts by using a triple differences
estimator. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) find a significant increase in the
employment rate among lone mothers, which was due to a higher rate of entry into
as well as a lower rate of exit out of employment. Francesconi, Rainer, and Van
Der Klaauw (2009), on the other hand, report insignificant impact on mothers with
partners, but find stronger positive effect among women with low earning partners.
In summary, empirical evidence suggests a significantly positive labour supply effect
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of WFTC among lone mothers and women with unemployed partners, whilst evi-
dence shows a limited effect for women with working partners. The estimates from
these studies range between 2.2 and 7 percentage points increases for lone mothers;
0.1 and 4.8 percentage points for women with unemployed partners; -0.6 and 2.7
percentage points for women with employed partners.
The above analysis exclusively focuses on the potential impacts of WFTC. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 1.2.2, this period in the UK saw other employment
related policies that also affected childless households.
Firstly, the 1999 national minimum wage raised the wage rates of low income
households but may have also reduced the employment opportunities. The impact
on labour supply, however, is likely to be limited. Machin, Manning, and Rahman
(2003) and Machin and Wilson (2004) studied the impact on particularly low paid
workers, those in the care homes sector, and found reduction in employment but the
magnitude of such an effect was small. Stewart and Swaffield (2008), on the other
hand, find small but negative impact of the minimum wage on the number of working
hours. However, empirical evidence from the other UK studies almost uniformly
reports no adverse effects of the national minimum wage on the employment rate
(Stewart, 2002) nor the probability that employed individuals remain employed for
all demographic groups, including female workers (Stewart, 2002; Stewart, 2004b;
Stewart, 2004a; Connolly and Gregory, 2002).1 In the case of relatively limited
labour supply effect, the increased household income is likely to have shortened
birth intervals. If women were in employment, they would additionally face the
substitution effect, which would have worked to delay births due to the increased
opportunity cost of having a child.2
Secondly, the New Deal policies are also likely to have offered improved labour
1 Metcalf (2004) provides several most probable reasons for the lack of strong negative labour
market impacts. In particular, he points out that firms may have increased the labour productivity
and effort. Moreover, he suggests that the firms may have passed on the increased cost through
higher prices and lower profits in response to the introduction of the minimum wage.
2Currently, there is no empirical evidence on the impact of minimum wage on fertility.
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market opportunities. Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen (2004) and Wilkinson
(2003) both report significantly positive employment effects of the New Deal for
Young People among the male participants. Although only 25% of the participants
were women, these studies also find a positive employment impact among women.
Additionally, the New Deal for Lone Parents is also found to have had a positive
employment effect (Evans and Britain, 2003). Similarly to the case of the national
minimum wage, if New Deals affected women’s partners, this would shorten the
birth intervals through the income effect. If, on the other hand, women increased
their labour supply, the substitution effect would prolong the intervals.
Aside from the impact on fertility and labour supply, the WFTC and other pol-
icy introductions may have had an additional unintended impact on the partnership
formation of affected individuals, although the potential direction of the impact is
ambiguous. Partnership opportunities may have been positively pursued for the
purpose of additional childbearing. At the same time, policies introduced during
this period may have made partnership less attractive. The higher tax credits under
WFTC may have enabled individuals to maintain their lives in the absence of the
financial assistance from their partners. Additionally, the improved labour market
opportunities due to various policies as well as the childcare credit element of WFTC
that made childcare affordable are likely factors that potentially have accelerated
this trend. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) report a statistically signifi-
cant reduction of partnership formation among lone mothers whereas Francesconi,
Rainer, and Van Der Klaauw (2009) report a significant increase in the divorce rate
among women with partners working less than 16 hours. Both effects were particu-
larly strong for women with young children where the impact of WFTC is likely to
be the strongest.
Summing up the above, the potential overall impact on the timing of birth is
mixed and the WFTC incentive to shorten birth intervals is likely to have been
offset, at least partially, by the increase in the labour supply of the affected women.
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Single women and lone mothers were particularly prone to the positive labour supply
effect. Therefore, the fertility timing is likely to be limited for these demographic
groups of women. On the other hand, women with partners are less likely to be
affected by the increase in the labour supply, but rather are likely to have benefitted
from their partners’ increased labour market participation. This, thus, implies a
potentially stronger fertility effect among women in couples. However, the size
of the shortening of birth interval impact is likely to be smaller for women with
unemployed partners compared to those with employed partners, since the former
group of women are observed to have increased their labour supply in response to
the WFTC introduction.
1.4 Previous literature
There is a large literature studying the effects of various lump sum cash transfer
programs on families’ fertility decisions (see for example, Moffitt (1997) and Gauthier
(2007) for summaries of the literature in the US and Europe respectively). However,
what sets WFTC apart from the others is that it was not a simple cash transfer
aiming to affect fertility but was also an in-work tax credit, requiring at least one
member of the family to participate in the labour market. For this reason, only
those studies that evaluated policies that simultaneously affected the labour supply
and fertility behaviours are reviewed in this section.
There are three papers that investigate the WFTC impact on fertility. Francesconi
and Van der Klaauw (2007) evaluate the impact of WFTC on single women, whilst
Francesconi, Rainer, and Van Der Klaauw (2009), and Brewer, Ratcliffe, and Smith
(2010) study the effect on women in couples.
Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) study the effects of WFTC on single
women. Employing the 1991-2001 BHPS, they separately estimate linear proba-
bility models to find out how WFTC affected single childless women’s entrance to
lone motherhood as well as lone mothers’ probabilities of subsequent births. More
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specifically, the former group is studied by including a sample of childless women in
year t who remained single for at least two periods. Similarly, women with children
in period t who remained single for the minimum of two years were included for the
study of lone mothers’ transition to subsequent births. The policy impact was iden-
tified by using a difference estimator comparing each groups transition probabilities
before and after the introduction of WFTC. The estimated results indicate insignif-
icant 0.2 percentage points reductions in the risk of entering lone motherhood. This
is approximately a 15 % decline in the risk. For single women with children, the risk
of subsequent births is also insignificantly reduced by between 0.2 and 1 percentage
points depending on the number and the age groups of previously born children.
Using the same data and the empirical specification, Francesconi, Rainer, and
Van Der Klaauw (2009) look at the fertility impact on women who are in couples
by studying the transition to first and higher order births. They find insignificant
delay of first and higher order birth (-0.07 and -0.5 percentage points respectively).
Brewer, Ratcliffe, and Smith (2010) also study the WFTC impact on women
with partners. In particular, by using two repeated cross sectional data, 1995-2003
Family Resources Survey and 1990-2003 Family Expenditure Survey, they estimate
a linear probability model to study the effect on the probability of birth. Policy im-
pact is identified using a difference-in-differences estimator comparing women with
O-level or less education (treatment group) to those with A-level and more qualifi-
cation (control group).3 Contrary to the findings from Francesconi, Rainer, and Van
Der Klaauw (2009), they find a significantly positive impact on the probability of
first and third birth. Overall estimated impact on the probability of all birth parity
is an increase of 15%. Additionally, they also studied the timing effect by looking at
how age at first birth changed during the period of study. They find an insignificant
negative effect on the age at first birth.
Studies on a similar policy also exist in the US. Papers by Duchovny (2001)
3An O-level is a UK qualification, which is usually taken at the age of 15 or 16. An A-level, on
the other hand, is an advanced level UK qualification that is taken at the age of 18.
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and Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003, 2009) all investigate the impact of the
increases in the amount of US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on fertility. Just
as for WFTC, EITC requires parents’ participation in the labour market as it is
paid to tax filers.
EITC has gone through various reforms since its introduction in 1975. Prior to
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 1990, the amount of the maximum
EITC was fixed regardless of the family size. After 1990, the amount was made to
depend on the number of children in the household and higher credits were given
to families with two or more children. Moreover, the OBRA 1990 increased the
amount of the base credit over the period of 1991-1993. The OBRA 1993 brought
a further increase in the amounts of both the base and incremental elements, and
these increases were implemented during the period of 1994-1996. As a result of these
reforms, affected families were presented with additional incentives to have first and
higher order births. In addition, the federal EITC reforms were accompanied by
introductions of state level EITCs.4 The amount of tax credits varies by state and
are typically calculated as percentages of the federal EITC. The 1990 and 1993
OBRA together with the introductions of the state EITCs presented variations in
the amounts of EITC across states over the years (for a detailed explanation of the
structure and the reforms of EITC, see for example Baughman and Dickert-Conlin
(2009)).
Duchovny (2001) focuses on the impact of EITC expansion on the probability
of having a second child. Using the March Current Population Survey for the years
between 1989 and 2000, she estimate linear probability models separately by marital
status and race. A difference-in-differences estimator is employed comparing women
with different parity and educational level. Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003),
on the other hand, report the impact on the first birth whilst Baughman and Dickert-
Conlin (2009) study the impacts separately for first and higher order births. Using
4Although there were only four states offering state-level tax credits prior to 1990, additional
seven states introduced the tax credits between 1990 and 1999.
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the US birth certificate data between 1990 and 1999, they calculate a birth rate,
which is a ratio between the number of women who gave birth in a year and childless
women, for each of the age-state-year-race-education cell. They use the amount of
EITC in the previous year to identify the policy effect.
The US evidence on the impact of EITC on fertility is also mixed. For the first
birth, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) find a negative effect of the increase
in the tax credits on the birth rate for white single women, but find a positive
impact for all the other demographic groups. However, Baughman and Dickert-
Conlin (2009) report negative overall impacts of the EITC reforms for all birth rates
regardless of women’s race or marital status. In addition to the probability of birth
analysis, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009) also estimate how the age at first
birth changed over time. The findings are consistent with those from the probability
of birth analysis as they find a small but a significant delaying effect of the increase
in the maximum amount of EITC. For the second birth, the reported estimates
in Duchovny (2001) reveal positive impacts for non-white single women and white
married women. However, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009) show that only
a very small positive effect is found for non-white single women and all the other
women experienced reduction in the birth rates in response to the increase in the
amount of EITC.
Finally, a recent Spanish study by Azmat and Gonzalez (2010) look at the impact
of the 1999 and 2003 Spanish tax reform on the probability of birth.
Before 1999, the Spanish households with children received income tax credits.
The 1999 reform replaced the tax credits with the “child reductions”, which was
deducted from the taxable income. The amount of the reductions was dependent on
the number of children in each household. Due to this reform, families with children
saw a reduction in the amount of income tax and were presented with the incentives
to have additional children. The 2003 reform further increased the amount of the
“child reductions”, but also introduced a new tax credit for employed mothers with
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children under the age of three. Azmat and Gonzalez (2010) exploit the increase
in the financial incentives that encourage childbearing and female labour market
attachments and study the impact on the probability of birth. They use the 1992-
2008 Spanish Labour Force Survey, which is a repeated cross sectional data set,
and identify the policy impact by using a difference estimator. The estimates from
a linear probability model indicate a positive and significant impact of the 1999
reform for the probability of third birth (i.e. 12%). They also report a significant
increase in the probability of first birth (i.e. 7%) as a result of the 2003 reform.
In summary, the existing papers present mixed evidence of the policy impacts. It
is, therefore, crucial to further investigate the impact of WFTC and the findings from
this chapter add complementary evidence to the existing literature. Compared to
the above studies, the second chapter incorporates the following three novel features
simultaneously for the first time.
Firstly, this chapter studies the impact of WFTC on the timing of birth by using a
multiple-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogene-
ity. The timing effect is studied by calculating the probability of birth conditioning
on not giving birth in the previous periods. This is in contrast to the probability
of birth model employed in most of the previous papers, which instead estimates
the unconditional probability of birth. Whilst some papers investigate the policy
impact on the timing of birth by evaluating the change in the age at first birth (i.e.
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009) and Brewer et al (2010)), such a model fails
to take account of women who did not give birth by the time of the interview. The
exclusion of these right censored observations is likely to bias the estimates. The
hazard model employed in this chapter, on the other hand, explicitly takes account
of the censored observations in the specification. Moreover, in contrast to the age
at first birth model, the multiple-spell model with unobserved heterogeneity allows
us to study the timing impact of the second and subsequent births whilst taking
account of potential correlations across birth intervals.
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Secondly, unlike most of the previous studies, this chapter uses a panel dataset.
In repeated cross sectional data, women are only observed once on an interview
day. As a result, the individual characteristics from the particular interview day
are often used for the analysis. On the other hand, it is possible to follow the
same individuals when panel data is employed. Using this feature, demographic
characteristics prior to birth can also be observed. When analysing the fertility
behaviour, it is particularly important to control for individual characteristics prior
to births. This is because a birth is an outcome, which is observed several years
after the decision for conception is made. The panel data structure also allows us
to observe individual fertility history and the correctly identify birth parity for each
woman. Given that the probability of birth is likely to differ across parity, this
ensures accurate selection of women for the analysis.
Thirdly, compared to some studies that use a difference estimator (i.e. Francesconi
and Van der Klaauw (2007); Francesconi et al. (2009); Azmat and Gonzalez (2010)),
this chapter uses a difference-in-differences estimator. A difference estimator iden-
tifies the policy impact by comparing the probabilities of birth before and after
the policy introduction. This identification strategy fails if there are other macro
trends. In such a case, the estimated effect would also reflect the trends on top of
the policy effect. To control for this potential trends, these studies include linear or
quadratic trend terms. In contrast, a difference-in-differences estimator employed
in the second chapter controls for the trend in a more flexible manner by using a
control group of women, who shares similar characteristics but is not affected by the
introduction of WFTC.
1.5 Identification strategy
One potential way to identify the policy impact is to compare the birth intervals
of affected individuals before and after the introduction date. This, however, is
problematic if there are other factors affecting the birth durations over time. In
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such a case, the estimated impact would include not only the policy effect but also
other macro trends. Instead, this chapter uses a difference-in-differences estimator in
order to isolate other effects and identify the policy impact by defining a comparison
group which includes women who have similar characteristics but were unaffected by
WFTC. Using this comparison group, the policy impact is uncovered by evaluating
how the differences in the timing of birth between the two groups of women changed
before and after 1999.
One of the eligibility condition of WFTC requires that individuals come from
low income households. The use of a household income variable would, therefore,
ensure correct selection of individuals who were actually qualified to receive WFTC.
However, the variable is likely to be endogenous, since WFTC directly affected
household income. Moreover, it is likely to be simultaneously determined with fer-
tility if female labour supply is reduced due to pregnancy. As a result, an educational
variable is used instead to proxy for the level of household income. More specifically,
individuals with O-level or less education are included in the treatment group.
Defining the control group is more problematic. One crucial assumption for the
difference-in-differences is that the two groups of women experience a common trend
in the absence of the policy. This assumption poses a difficulty in the context of
WFTC. Since it was introduced at the national level, there are no counterparts with
similar demographic characteristics. Therefore, although less than perfect, women
with more than O-level education are used as the control group. These women may
also be affected by WFTC, but they are much less likely to receive large amounts
of WFTC compared to those in the treatment group.
To see how women’s timing of birth differ by educational attainment, Figure 1.3
presents the trends of mean age at first birth between 1991 and 2003. The thick
line shows the trend for women with O-level or less education (i.e. women in the
treatment group). The dotted line presents the trends for women with A-level or
more but below first degree qualification and thin line indicates the trends for women
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with more than first degree. These statistics are calculated using the 1991-2003 raw
BHPS dataset. Comparing the three lines, trends of the age at first birth seem to
be relatively stable for all groups of women. The trend for the control group is
the most stable over the years with a slight upward trend after 1999. Women in
the treatment group seem to have experienced an upward trend that is particularly
evident from around 1998. Finally, women with more than first degree experienced
the largest increase in the age at first birth. This group of women are least likely to
have been affected by any of the UK in-work benefits and thus the observed increase
is likely to be due to other factors. One possible cause is the drastic increase in the
participation of female students in further education. The Department for Children,
Schools and Families reports that the number of female students enrolled in the
further education increased from 352,800 in 1990/1991 to 794,000 in 2004/2005
academic year. The size of expansion is particularly large among postgraduate
degrees where the number of females increased by approximately three times (from
33,800 to 114,200) in 2004/2005 compared to 1990/1991. If this, indeed, was the
factor for the increase in the age at first birth among highly educated women, it is
unlikely that such trend is shared with low income women. To ensure similarities
between the two groups as much as possible, women with more than first degree are
excluded from the control group.
1.6 Empirical specification
Birth is a continuous and sequential process where the first birth is followed by
the second and third births. However, the BHPS only collects the birth month and
year of each child. Reflecting the multiple-spell structure of birth processes together
with the grouped nature of the data, a multiple-spell discrete-time proportional
hazard model is employed. Time of birth is studied for a sample of childless women
to have up until their third child. This chapter considers the time until first birth
as the first spell, and the time to second and third births as second and third spells
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respectively.5
In the following section, the subscripts i, k, j are used to each denote the ith
individual, kth spell (where 1≤k≤3), and jth period. The grouped nature of the
data implies that the kth birth is recorded to have been given in the jth period if she
gave birth on the continuous time scale between (j−1) and j of the kth spell. Some
individuals experience all spells (i.e. have a total of three children) whilst others
only go through some of the spells. Only those individuals who complete the kth
spell proceeds to the k + 1th spell. J ik is used to describe the last time period that
individual i is observed for the kth spell. As an example, Figure 1.2 illustrates the
fertility processes of two individuals (i=1 and 2). Individual 1 begins her fertility
process in a calender year τ0 when she is childless and experiences three spells. She
completes her first spell (i.e. has her first child) after five periods (J11=5 in k1=1
spell) and the second spell in the fourth period of the second spell (J12=4 in k1=2
spell). She finally finishes her process by having her third birth in the fourth period
of the third spell (J13=4 in K1=3). On the other hand, the second individual begins
her process in another calender year τ1 and completes her first spell after the seventh
period (J21=7, k2=1). Although she enters her second spell, she does not give birth
to her second child and reaches the end of the observation period T. Her last spell,
therefore, is K2=2 and her observation is right censored.
The underlying continuous hazard is given in Eq. 1.1 for an individual i, in
the jth period of the kth spell. The underlying hazard is the instantaneous rate of
having kth child in period j conditioning on her only having k − 1 child in period
j − 1.
θik(j|x, β) = λk(j)exp[xik(j)′β]vi, vi > 0 (1.1)
where λk(j) is the spell-specific baseline hazard and vi denotes the individual spe-
5The analysis in this section is based on Jenkins (2005) and Willett and Singer (1995).
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cific unobserved heterogeneity, which is spell invariant. Inclusion of unobserved het-
erogeneity is important, since uncontrolled unobserved heterogeneity would cause
spurious negative duration dependence as those with higher hazards tend to exit
first (Lancaster and Nickell, 1980; Van den Berg, 2001). Moreover, controlling for
the unobserved heterogeneity addresses the potential inter-birth spell correlations.
This is done by assuming that the individual specific effect does not change across
spells (e.g. individuals’ preferences for birth are stable from time to first until third
birth) and such fixed individual characteristics are the source of correlations.6
The discrete hazard function is given in Eq.1.2.
hik(j|xik(j), vi) = P [Tk = j|Tk > j − 1, xik(j), vi]
= 1− exp[−
∫ j
j−1
θil(l)dl]
= 1− exp[−exp(xik(j)′β + γk(j) + lnvi)]
(1.2)
where
γk(j) = ln[
∫ j
j−1
λk(l)dl] (1.3)
where γk(j) denotes a spell-specific piece-wise constant baseline hazard, which is
estimated by including a set of period and spell-specific indicator variables. The
xik(j) contains individual characteristics together with the following three variables
which are crucial for the identification of the policy impact. Treatmenti is a time-
invariant dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ith woman has O-level or less
6Spell invariant unobserved heterogeneity may be a rather restrictive assumption if, for example,
individuals’ preferences for second and third children change when they have their first child. To
ensure tractability, only a time invariant unobserved heterogeneity is included in this chapter. This,
therefore, implies that the unobserved heterogeneity only captures the time invariant individual
fertility characteristics such as the level of fecundity or fixed preferences towards having children.
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qualifications in the initial period and 0 if she has A-level or more but less than first
degree. This variable picks out the constant difference between the two groups of
women. Afterj is an indicator variable for the period after 1999 to control for the
potential macro difference before and after the introduction of WFTC. Finally, a
variable interacting the previous two, i.e. Treatmenti ∗Afterj, captures the policy
impact. These three variables are separately estimated by parity to allow for the
impact to differ by birth order. Under the specification in Eq. 1.2, these covariates
proportionally influence the baseline hazard function. The shape of the spell-specific
baseline hazard, however, is common between the two groups of women.
One advantage of studying the timing response by using duration analysis frame-
work is that it clearly addresses the differential probability of birth depending on
the length of the prior time periods that women remained childless. For example,
an individual who remained childless until the age of 20 is likely to experience a
differential probability of first birth compared to women who is without a child at
the age of 30. In the duration analysis framework, such duration dependence is ad-
dressed by the inclusion of the baseline hazard, γk(j). More specifically, each period
specific dummy calculates the baseline hazard rate of giving kth birth in period j,
provided that she remained childless until j-1th period. In addition, the duration
dependence is likely to differ across birth parity. In order to address the differen-
tial duration dependence across parity, the spell specific baseline hazard allows the
duration dependence to be estimated separately for each birth order.
The direction of the duration dependence is not clear. On the one hand, women
may experience increasing hazard rate the longer they stay without giving births.
This would imply positive duration dependence. On the other hand, the level of fe-
cundity goes down with age. As a result, the hazard rate is likely to exhibit negative
duration dependence as women get older. Previous findings seem to suggest positive
duration dependence for the time to first birth (e.g. Neumark (1992), Newman and
McCulloch (1984), Heckman and Walker (1990)), with an exception of Heckman,
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Holtz, and Walker (1985), who find negative quadratic duration dependence. For
subsequent births, the evidence is divided. On the one hand, Heckman and Walker
(1990) suggest positive duration dependence. On the other hand, however, Newman
et al. (1984) and Heckman, Holtz, and Walker (1985) report negative quadratic du-
ration dependence.
The discrete-time survival function, which describes the probability that indi-
vidual i does not have birth between the period 1 to J ik is given by
Sik(J ik) =
Jik∏
j=1
P [T k > j]
=
Jik∏
j=1
(1− hik(j))
(1.4)
On the other hand, the discrete density, which is the probability of remaining
childless until J ik − 1 and having the kth child in period J ik, is given by
f ik(J ik) = P [Tk = J ik|Tk > J ik − 1]
Jik−1∏
j=1
P [T k > j]
= hik(J ik)
Jik−1∏
j=1
(1− hik(j))
(1.5)
Let cik be an indicator variable that equals one if the kth spell of individual
i is censored and zero if uncensored. Then the likelihood function, ignoring the
unobserved heterogeneity vi is
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L =
n∏
i=1
Ki∏
k=1
[(f ik(J ik))
1−cik(Sik(J ik))cik ]
=
n∏
i=1
Ki∏
k=1
[hik(J ik)
Jik−1∏
j=1
(1− hik(j))]1−cik [
Jik∏
j=1
(1− hik(j))]cik
=
n∏
i=1
Ki∏
k=1
[(
hik(J ik)
1− hik(J ik))
1−cik ][
Jik∏
j=1
(1− hik(j))]
(1.6)
Let yikj be an indicator variable which shows whether birth is observed in each
period of the individual i’s observations. If individual i’s kth spell is censored (i.e.
cik = 1), then yikj is zero for all periods for the spell. On the other hand, for the
uncensored spells, yikj is zero for all periods apart from the last period of the spell,
J ik. Using yikj, Eq.1.6 can be rewritten as
L =
n∏
i=1
Ki∏
k=1
Jik∏
j=1
[hik(j)]
yikj [1− hik(j)]1−yikj (1.7)
The above likelihood ignores the unobserved heterogeneity. Since vi is unob-
served, however, it needs to be integrated out to marginalise the likelihood function.
The likelihood, thus, becomes
L =
n∏
i=1
(
∫
[
Ki∏
k=1
Jik∏
j=1
[hik(j)]
yikj [1− hik(j)]1−yikj ]f(vi)dvi) (1.8)
Marginalisation of the likelihood function requires an assumption which imposes
a particular distribution for the density of vi. In this chapter, vi is assumed to follow
a normal distribution, although using a gamma distribution gives almost identical
estimates. This is not surprising, since identification of the model under multiple-
spell setting is independent of the choice of mixing distribution in the absence of
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lagged duration dependence (Honore´, 1993).
The above expression does not have a closed form solution. Instead, it is approx-
imated by adaptive quadrature, which replaces the continuous f(vi) with a discrete
distribution using m possible values from vi. Then the parameters are estimated
by finding the values of β, γk(j) (from Eq. 1.2) and the variance of f(vi), σ
2
v . The
reported estimates set m to be 12. The number of points was altered between 8 and
24 to check the robustness of the estimates, but this only had a very minor effect
on the size of the estimates (i.e. less than 3 decimal places).
1.7 Data
The main data employed is the 1991-2003 BHPS. The BHPS is a nationally
representative longitudinal data set collected annually since 1991. The panel consists
of over 10,000 individuals from 5,000 UK households. The interviews were carried
out at the household and individual level and include all individuals over the age of
16, who reside in the same house. Aside from the main BHPS file, this chapter also
uses the BHPS consolidated marital, cohabitation and fertility file. This file contains
lifetime fertility and partnership history information on the BHPS respondents.
Since the main BHPS file only contains information on children who reside with
their parents, the oldest child may no longer be recorded in BHPS if a woman
gave birth at a very young age. The lifetime fertility information, thus, allows us
to correctly identify the parity of each birth as well as the birth year. This is
particularly important in the context of fertility analysis as the incentive to have
additional children is likely to depend on the number of existing children. Similarly,
partnership information is important when identifying the policy impact separately
by marital status as the data allows us to find out when individuals started or ended
their partnerships.
The years of observations used in this chapter is between 1991 and 2003. The
cut off year 2003 was chosen in order to avoid including the impact of the two new
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credits, the Working Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit, which were implemented
since April 2003.
Observations are selected using a flow-sampling and are organized in a person-
year format. The flow-sampling includes individuals whenever they enter a state
of interest during the observation years and these individuals are followed until
they either give birth or reach the year 2003. Under the alternative stock sampling
scheme, all childless women in a particular year are included. In this chapter, the
flow-sampling is chosen over the stock sampling, since the latter scheme implicitly
collects individuals with longer durations. In other words, the probability of being
included in the stock sample is higher for individuals with longer durations. The
flow-sampling avoids such length bias. The person-year format implies that the same
individual appears in the sample as many years until she either gives her third birth
or she reaches the year 2003 with less than three births. The width of the step, a
year, is decided in order to impose less parametric structure on the baseline hazard
whilst having enough birth observations.
Reflecting the chosen sampling scheme, women who are childless at the age of
19 are included as soon as they turn 20 at any point between 1991 and 2003. The
sample of women is followed until either the third births are observed or they reach
the year 2003 with less than three children. The choice of the initial age 20 implies
that the women are assumed to face the risk of conception from the age of 20.
The age 20 is chosen as a starting point as more than 90% of women are childless
at this age. Moreover, the sample of women is divided into the treatment and
control group on the basis of their educational attainment. By the age of 20, it is
clear whether they are pursuing further education or they have completed schooling
before starting their first degree. Individuals who are long-term ill or in full-time
education are excluded from the sample.
Due to the relatively small sample size, some individuals who were older than 20
in 1991 are followed back until when they were 20 as long as they were childless at
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the age of 19. The information from the BHPS consolidated marital, cohabitation
and fertility file provides us with individual fertility and marital history and allows
us to find out whether and when individuals gave birth or got married. As a result,
the years of observations span between 1985 and 2003.7
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the individual gave
birth in a particular year. The demographic variables included are characteristics
that are likely to affect fertility decisions such as ethnicity, age in the initial period
and its square, as well as housing tenure. The regional dummies are also included in
order to allow for differential characteristics across regions. The analysis uses a long
panel of observations. Individuals who are 20 in 1991 may have different timing of
birth compared to those who are 20 in 2000. In order to control for this differential
fertility timing across cohorts, indicator variables that take account of when women
entered the sample are also included.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.2. Table 1.2 show that the 7 % of
control group women and 9 % of treatment group women give first birth. Moreover,
out of those who gave first birth, nearly 17 % (6 %) of women give second (third)
birth in each group. Table 1.2 also shows that affected women tend more likely to be
non-white and less likely to own houses compared to those in the control group. The
use of the educational variable to identify treatment and control groups seems to
clearly separate lower income households from families with slightly higher income.
Because of the evident disparities in some of the demographic characteristics between
the two groups, further analysis is carried out in Section 1.9 to test whether the two
groups of women experienced a similar trend before 1999.
7Although the inclusion of many years prior to the policy introduction may cause two groups
to exhibit differential time trends, regressions estimated using data between 1991 and 2003 did not
change the findings. These additional results are available upon request.
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1.8 Results
1.8.1 Graphical examinations of the policy effects
Figure 1.4 presents the life table survival functions for each birth spell. The life
table analysis allows us to visually examine the policy impact by using the sample
of women discussed in Section 1.7.
The survival functions, indicating the proportion of women who remained child-
less until each period, are calculated separately by birth spells. Moreover, within
each spell, the functions are presented separately by treatment status and compar-
ing the rate of survival before and after 1999. More specifically, the left side panels
((a), (c), (e)) compare the survival functions of the treatment group before and after
1999. Similarly, the right hand side panel ((b), (d), (f)) show the survival functions
for the women in the control group. In all these figures, lines indicate the proportion
of women who remained childless until each period.
One thing to note is that the definition of the x axis, denoted as “period”, differ
according to the spell of interest. For the first spell analysis in panels (a) and (b),
all women start their spells at the age of 20. Therefore, the values on the x axis
imply the year since the age 20. On the other hand, the axis in panels (c) and (d)
implies years since the observed first birth. Similarly, for the third spell, the values
on the x axis in panels (e) and (f) indicate years since the observed second birth.
Looking at panel (a) in Figure 1.4, more women in the treatment group remain
childless for a longer period after 1999. For example, in panel (a), the proportion of
women in the treatment group who remained childless until the age of 27 before the
year 1999 is approximately 80% of the sample. On the other hand, those who remain
childless until the same age after the year 1999 is nearly 90% of the sample.8. On
the contrary, panel (b) suggests that the control group women did not experience
8These statistics are calculated using the formula Sˆ(t) =
∏j
s=1(1 − dsns ) where ds and ns each
denotes the number of birth in a particular period and the number at risk at the start of each
period, respectively. The proportions of birth for each parity reported in Table 1.2 are rough
approximations for dsns .
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significant changes in the timing of first birth before and after 1999. Assuming that
these two groups of women followed similar trends in the absence of WFTC and
the other policies introduced in 1999, these two figures indicate a potential delaying
effect of the policies on the timing of first birth.
A similar analysis from panels (c) and (d) reveals an opposite story. Women
in the control group, again, experienced only a marginal effect on the timing of
second birth. However, those in the treatment group reduced the time to second
birth. Combining the two panels, thus, presents evidence that the affected women
shortened the time to second birth.
Lastly, potential changes to the timing of third birth can be found from panels
(e) and (f). Here, unlike the other cases, the control group women exhibit differen-
tial survival rates before and after 1999. In particular, evidence seems to suggest
shortening of the third spell during the post-reform period. On the contrary, women
in the treatment group did not experience such a change. This could potentially
indicate a delaying effect among the affected women. However, the small sample
size of the third spell (only 5% of the sample proceeded to the third spell) raises
doubts on the accuracy of the estimates to reflect the policy impact. Therefore, the
interpretation of the third spell results needs to take this into account accordingly.
1.8.2 The regression results
Turning to the regression results, Table 1.3 shows the main results estimated
using the multiple-spell discrete-time proportional hazard model with normally
distributed unobserved heterogeneity. The reported coefficients on Treatmenti ×
Afterj present the policy impacts by each parity. These coefficients scale the base-
line hazard proportionally, keeping the shape of the baseline hazard constant. The
negative coefficients imply delaying of birth as the hazard is lower due to the policy
introduction.
Column (1) of Table 1.3 reports the estimates for all women regardless of their
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initial marital status. It is of interest not to condition on the marital status at
first, since this allows us to understand the overall impact of policies on the affected
women. The estimate for all women in column (1) suggests a statistically significant
delay of the first birth. The timing of the second birth is positive, albeit insignificant.
Although the results for the third spell should be interpreted with caution due to the
small sample size, the reported coefficient is negative and thus suggests a delaying
effect of the third birth.
Due to the nonlinearity of the hazard model, understanding the size of the esti-
mated impact on fertility requires interpretation of the coefficients in relation to the
baseline hazard. In order to do this, the hazard for each period is predicted with
and without the policy impact coefficient on Treatmenti × Afterj and by setting
the continuous variables to the sample mean. Comparing the predicted hazard with
and without the policy impact coefficient reveals a reduction in the probability of
first birth by approximately 40%. This reduction in the hazard implies an average
delay of first birth by approximately 1.7 years. Similarly, the estimates indicate
approximately 40% and 28% increases in the probability of second and third birth,
respectively. This increase in the probability suggests an average shortening of time
to second birth by 1.8 years. Time to third birth, on the other hand, seems to have
been delayed by approximately 8 months.
The column (1) of Table A.1 in the Appendix shows all the other estimates
that are not included in Table 1.3. The estimated baseline hazard function for first
spell suggests positive duration dependence until period 12 or until the age of 32.
However, the hazard rate declines after period 12. Similar negative quadratic dura-
tion dependence can be observed for the second and the third spell. These estimates
seem to confirm the prediction that younger women exhibit positive duration depen-
dence whilst the hazard rate gradually falls once women start to experience reduced
fecundity.
The theoretical predictions in Section 1.3 suggest differential policy effects by
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marital status. In the next analysis, therefore, policy impacts are separately esti-
mated for women with and without partners.
Firstly, column (1) of Table 1.4 presents the estimated effect on the single
women’s entry to lone motherhood. A subgroup of women is selected from the
“all women”sample discussed in Section 1.7. In particular, women are included in
the subsample if they became 20 year old at any time during the observation years
and also, if they stayed single throughout the first spell. Only the effect on the
timing of first birth is estimated, since very few women continued to stay single to
have second child.
Secondly, column (2) looks at the policy impact on lone mothers’ subsequent
birth timing. For this analysis, women with one child are included in the sample
from the year that they are observed to have separated from their first partners.
The year of separation is chosen as the initial period of observation, since women
who have been separated for several years are likely to have a different probability
of birth compared to women who recently became separated.
Lastly, the policy impact on women with partners is shown in column (3). Sim-
ilarly to the “lone motherhood” sample, women are included in the sample from
the year in which they are observed to have formed the first partnership conditional
on being childless a year before. One thing to note is that apart from the first
subsample (i.e. a sample to study the single women’s entry to lone motherhood),
neither the “lone motherhood” nor the “women in couples” samples condition on the
individuals’ marital status in subsequent periods. If, for example, WFTC affected
the probability of remaining in the first partnership, such an effect would also be
reflected in the reported policy impacts.9
Table 1.4 shows the results for each group of women. Theoretically, both the
9Due to the limited number of observations in the “single women” and the “lone mother”
samples, regressions for these groups are estimated with a quadratic baseline hazard instead of
the flexible piecewise constant baseline hazard. The quadratic baseline hazard is chosen, since the
results are similar to those that are computed with the flexible piecewice constant baseline hazard.
Although this imposes an additional parametric assumption on the baseline hazard, estimates can
be obtained even when the sample size is relatively small.
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single women and lone mothers were exposed to positive labour supply impacts of
the UK policies during this period. It is, therefore, not surprising that the fertility
impacts estimated for these groups of women are generally negative, although the
estimates are all insignificant. The estimated policy impact on the timing of single
women’s entry to lone motherhood in column (1) suggests an insignificant reduction
in the probability of first birth by approximately 25% or a delay of six months.
Column (2), on the other hand, presents the policy impacts on the lone mothers’
timing of second and third births. For this group of women, the estimated impacts
indicate approximately 32% reduction in the probability of second birth or a 2-year
delay. The estimated result for the timing of third birth, on the other hand, is an
insignificant shortening of birth interval by 1 year.
Women in couples, in contrast, are less likely to have experienced the labour
supply impact of the UK policies, particularly if their partners were employed. As
a result, out of the three demographic groups, this group of women are expected to
have been exposed to the strongest fertility incentives to shorten the birth intervals.
The estimates in column (3) of Table 1.4 somewhat confirms the prediction, although
all estimates again are insignificant regardless of the birth parity. The policies are
estimated to have negatively affected the hazard for first birth by approximately
20%, which is an average delay of approximately 1 year. On the other hand, the
estimated impact on the second birth seems to suggest an increase of hazard by
approximately 50% or a reduction in the birth interval by 2 years. The birth interval
to third birth also seems to have been shortened by 1.6 years, although just as all
the other third birth estimates, the small sample size undermines the precision of
the estimates.
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1.9 Robustness check
1.9.1 Test for the common trend assumption
The results in the previous section reflect the policy impact only if women in
the treatment group follow the same time trend as those in the control group in the
absence of the policy introductions. Column (1) of Table 1.5 replicates the analysis
of Table 1.3, but restricts the sample to only include observations prior to 1999
in order to test whether women experienced differential trends before the policy
introductions.
Looking at the estimates presented in columns (1), the previously observed sig-
nificant delaying of first birth was not present before 1999 for the “all women”
sample. The size of the estimates for the time to second birth is also smaller and,
thus, confirms the absence of differential trends.
1.9.2 Estimates with alternative sample division years
January, 1999 is approximately nine months after the policy announcement date,
March 1998. If the individuals are assumed to have changed their fertility behaviour
since the announcement date, any births after January 1999 would reflect the re-
sponses to the policy introduction. Therefore, the main analysis discussed in Section
1.8 uses the year 1999 to divide the sample into pre and post-reform periods. To
check if the results indeed showed the impact of the 1999 reforms, additional analy-
sis is carried out by replicating the results of Table 1.3, but using the year 1998 and
2000 as alternative division years. If the year 1999 was indeed the correct division
year, dividing the sample by 1998 should reduce the size of the estimates, since
the shift would allocate one-year worth of unaffected observations and label them
as affected. On the other hand, using the year 2000 may increase the size of the
estimates, since this allows the individuals one additional year to respond to the
policy introduction. However, at the same time, moving the 1999 year data to the
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pre-policy period may reduce the size of differences between the before and after
periods.
The results presented in column (2) of Table 1.5 tell us the same story as those in
the main analysis in Table 1.3. As expected, the estimates with 1998 division year
are generally smaller. Even when the year 2000 is used, the significant delaying of
first birth is still present, although the sizes of impacts on the timing of the second
and third birth both are now much smaller.
1.9.3 Further analysis
One somewhat surprising result from Section 1.8 is the strong delaying impact on
the timing of first birth (i.e. column 1 of Table 1.3). This finding is the only result
that is persistently found even when the definition of the division year is changed.
Although the theoretical prediction suggests a mixed impact from WFTC alone, it
is not clear why particularly the first birth was strongly affected. In particular, since
these women are not readily eligible for WFTC, they do not face the major delaying
incentive from the WFTC labour supply effect.
One potential explanation for this result is the influences from policies other than
WFTC. In particular, these women may have increased employment due to other
policies discussed in Section 1.2.2. Column (1) in Table 1.6 shows the estimated
impact on employment among the childless women aged between 16 and 40. This
result is estimated using the 1991-2003 Family Resources Survey, which is a large
UK repeated cross sectional data. As expected, these childless individuals increased
employment, although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to identify which of the
policies introduced during this period were the cause of this outcome.
Results in columns (2) and (3), on the other hand, suggest that those already
with one child did not increase employment after 1999, but women with two children
increased employment insignificantly. Interestingly, these results coincide with our
findings on fertility behaviour. In particular, estimates for the “all women” sample
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in column (1) of Table 1.3 suggest that women delayed first and third birth, but
shortened the timing of second birth. Therefore these estimates confirm the impor-
tance of the labour supply effect at least partially when analysing the impact of
WFTC and other policies on fertility.
1.9.4 Comparisons with the previous estimates
Comparing the estimates reported in this chapter to those in previous papers is
difficult due to the differential choices of data and empirical specification. Nonethe-
less, this section attempts to check if the reported estimates from the UK literature
reach any consensus.
Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) and Francesconi, Rainer, and Van
Der Klaauw (2009) are similar in spirit to this chapter as they also estimate the
probability of birth conditioning on no birth in the previous periods.
Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) report the estimated impacts separately
for single women’s entry to lone mothers and lone mothers’ subsequent births. They
suggest average declines in the probabilities of first and second birth by approxi-
mately 15% and 19%, respectively. In this chapter, Table 1.4 reports the relevant
estimates. In particular, the estimates suggest a decline of the probability of first
birth by 25%, whereas the impact on the second birth is a reduction of the proba-
bility by 32%.
For the analysis of women with partners, Francesconi, Rainer, and Van Der Klaauw
(2009) report a reduction in the probability of first birth by 13%. They also report
a reduction of the probability of second and subsequent birth (2%). On the other
hand, Table 1.3 suggests a reduction of the probability of first birth by 20% and an
increase of the probabillity of second birth by 50%.
For both analysis on the single women and the women in couples, all the estimates
discussed above are insignificant. However, although the direction of the impacts
are similar, the reported impacts from this chapter are somewhat larger.
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A potential source of disparity in the size of the impact is the choice of identifi-
cation strategy. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) and Francesconi, Rainer,
and Van Der Klaauw (2009) use a difference estimator whilst this chapter employs a
difference-in-differences estimator. On the one hand, the estimates from the present
paper are prone to bias caused by the use of an invalid control group, but such a
problem is absent when a difference estimator is used. On the other hand, a differ-
ence estimator may also be problematic if there are any macro trends other than the
welfare reforms that affected the timing of birth. They address the macro effect by
including a linear and a quadratic trend terms, though a difference-in-differences es-
timator would take account of this trend more flexibly when a correct control group
is used. The latter point may be relevant in explaining the observed differences in
the size of the reported impacts as the coefficients on the Afterj dummy variable
reported in this chapter generally suggest a positive macro trend at the national
level.
Most of the estimates reported in Brewer, Ratcliffe, and Smith (2010) are not
comparable to those in this chapter, since they estimate the unconditional proba-
bilities of birth rather than the conditional probabilities. However, they also report
the impact on the age at first birth, and show that the affected women in couples
insignificantly quickened their timing of first birth by approximately 8.4 months. In
this chapter, the results from column (3) of Table 1.4 report an insignificant delay
of approximately one year.
The differential sampling scheme may explain the observed differences in the
reported results. This chapter uses a sample of women who formed a partnership in
the first period, but these women could flexibly change their marital status in the
subsequent periods. However, they include women who are found to be in partner-
ships in each year. If fertility is positively related to the partnership formation, then
their sample would include a subgroup of women who formed stable relationships
due to births. Inclusion of this additional effect is likely to positively influence their
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estimates compared to the ones in this chapter, which indeed is what we observe
here.
1.10 Conclusions
This chapter investigated the impact of the 1999 WFTC introduction on the
fertility behaviour of the UK women. It provided complementary evidence to the
previous fertility studies of WFTC by presenting the findings for the policy impact
on the timing of birth.
In general, the results in this chapter showed that the overall impact of the
UK policies only affected the timing of first birth significantly. Moreover, further
analyses also revealed the delaying effect on first birth regardless of marital status,
albeit insignificantly. However, the results do conform to the theoretical predictions
and the delaying effect was particularly strong for the single women compared to
those with partners. In addition, the insignificant shortening effect of intervals to
second and third births were observed among the women in couples.
The effectiveness of WFTC to shorten the birth intervals may have been limited
for the first birth compared to subsequent births if the marginal cost of entering
parenthood is higher. This is likely to be the case, since compared to higher or-
der births, childbearing for the first time is more time intensive due to the need
to acquire the relevant skills to take care of a child. The results also suggest that
the positive fertility incentives may have had a stronger impact among women who
were eligible for WFTC, namely those women with partners who had at least one
child before the policy introduction. In fact, those without children were likely to
have been affected more strongly by other policies introduced during this period.
In particular, the further analysis in this chapter revealed that those without chil-
dren increased labour supply significantly. The strong delaying effect of first birth,
therefore, can be explained, at least partially, as the result of the increased labour
market opportunities provided to UK women during the period of analysis.
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1.11 Chapter One: Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Structures of FC and WFTC
 
WFTC:Childcare element
WFTC:Adult
FC: Adult
WFTC:Child FC:child 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
(Weekly household net income (£))
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Note: Amount of FC and WFTC are calculated for a family with one child under 11 
years old. Parents are assumed to be working at hourly wage of 3.6 pounds. Childcare 
cost is assumed to be 45 pounds per week. Both parents are assumed to be working 16 
hours or more when the net household income reaches £115.2 per week and hence are 
eligible to receive childcare element of FC and WFTC. One parent is assumed to be 
working 30 hours or more when the net weekly household income is over £158.94. 
Housing benefit and Council tax benefit are ignored for simplicity.   
 .          
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Figure 1.3: Trends of mean age at first birth by women’s educational attainment
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Control1 (between a-level and less than first degree)
Treatment1 (o-level and less) More than first degree
 
Note: This figure shows the UK trends of age at fist birth by educational attainment between 
1991 and 2003. The statistics are calculated using the 1991-2003 BHPS. The thick line shows the 
trends for women in the treatment group (those with or less than o-level education). The dotted line 
presents the trend for women in the control group (those with a-level and above but below first degree 
attainment), and the thin line indicates the trends for women with more than first degree.  
49
Figure 1.4: Life table survival functions
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Note: The lifetable estimates of the survival functions are plotted. In all these figures, these lines show 
the proportion of women  who remained childless until each period. The survival functions are plotted 
for before and after 1999 by treatment status and birth parity. The left and right figures each shows the 
survival functions for treatment  and control groups respectively. Data employed is the 1991-2003 
BHPS. Sample of childless women who were 20  in the initial period are included regardless of the 
marital status.  
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Table 1.1: Structure comparisons of FC and WFTC
Family Credit 
(1999 rate) 
Working Families Tax 
Credit 
(1999 rate) 
Eligibility condition 
Adult credit 
£48.80 
 
Basic tax credit 
£52.30 
 
At least one earner 
working more than 16 
hours and has a child 
Child credits 
 
£15.15(Under 11) 
 
£20.90(11-16) 
 
£25.95(16-18) 
Child tax credit 
£19.85(Under 11) 
£20.90(11-16) 
£25.95(16-18) 
At least one earner 
working more than 16 
hours and has a child 
30 hour tax credit 
 
£11.05. 
 
30 hour tax credit 
£11.05 
 
At least one earner 
working more than 
30 hours 
Childcare disregard 
 
Childcare costs of up to £60 
for one child and £100 for 
two or more children were 
disregarded from the 
family’s income when the 
calculation was made. 
 
Childcare cost subsidy 
 
70% of eligible childcare cost 
(£100 for one child and £150 
for two or more children) 
were subsidized. 
Both adults working 
more than 16 hours and 
has a child 
(eligibility condition 
for Childcare tax 
credit) 
Income threshold 
 
£79 
Income threshold 
 
£90 
N/A 
Deduction rate 
 
70% 
Deduction rate 
 
55% 
N/A 
 
Note: This table compares the structure of FC and WFTC. The first and second 
columns each summarises the structure of FC and WFTC respectively. The third 
column presents the eligibility conditions for each elements of FC/WFTC.  
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variables Control 1 Treatment1
Mean Mean
1 if first birth observed 0.07 0.09
1 if second birth observed 0.18 0.17
1 if third birth observed 0.06 0.07
Age 25.75 25.87
( 4.55 ) ( 4.74)
Household income 28780.19 23661.51
(17937.62) (16765.85)
Race
  White 0.93 0.89
  Black 0.003 0.01
  Other race 0.03 0.02
Housing tenure
  Owned 0.08 0.06
  Rented 0.65 0.51
  Mortgages 0.18 0.27
Region of residence
  North East 0.04 0.06
  North West 0.09 0.12
  Yorkshire 0.07 0.09
  East Midlands 0.07 0.07
  West Midlands 0.09 0.07
  East of England 0.08 0.07
  London 0.08 0.08
  South East 0.12 0.12
  South West 0.06 0.08
  Wales 0.10 0.10
  Scotland 0.19 0.13
Starting year dummy
  1 if observed from 1985 0.08 0.10
  1 if observed from 1986 0.08 0.08
  1 if observed from 1987 0.09 0.07
  1 if observed from 1988 0.07 0.05
  1 if observed from 1989 0.06 0.05
  1 if observed from 1990 0.07 0.06
  1 if observed from 1991 0.05 0.07
  1 if observed from 1992 0.05 0.06
  1 if observed from 1993 0.05 0.06
  1 if observed from 1994 0.05 0.05
  1 if observed from 1995 0.06 0.04
  1 if observed from 1996 0.05 0.03
  1 if observed from 1997 0.05 0.04
  1 if observed from 1998 0.04 0.04
  1 if observed from 1999 0.03 0.03
  1 if observed from 2000 0.02 0.02
  1 if observed from 2001 0.02 0.02
  1 if observed from 2002 0.01 0.01
  1 if observed from 2003 0.01 0.01
N 6241 7525
N(Individuals) 667 819
All women
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Table 1.6: Estimated marginal effects of the welfare reform impacts on women’s
employment status)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
All childless women Women with one 
child
Women with two 
children
Treatment×After 0.04** -0.00 0.03
(0.020) (0.024) (0.021)
After -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
Treatment -0.17*** -0.06*** -0.07***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 37,086 20,398 25,879
Note: This table presents the policy impact on employment by the number of children in the household.  
Data employed is the 1993-2003 Family Resources Survey . The dependent  variable is a dummy  that 
equals 1 if a woman is in employment. 
Covariates included are: age and its squared and cubed terms, housing tenure,  race, 
region of residence.  Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2 Chapter Two: Did the US infertility health
insurance mandates affect the timing of first
birth?
2.1 Introduction
Currently 6 million women in the United States experience difficulties in con-
ceiving a child even after a year of unprotected intercourse. The figures for the
proportion of women who faced impaired fecundity increased from 8% in 1982 to
10% in 1995 (Chandra and Stephen, 1998). Whilst various infertility treatment op-
tions are available to assist these couples, they are often extremely costly. Some
countries provide financial help, but in the U.S. patients often faced the full finan-
cial burden of the treatment.10 Between 1977 and 2001, state-level legislation was
introduced in 15 states which mandated health insurance providers to offer coverage
for the fertility treatment cost.
Mosher and Bachrach (1996) suggest that the observed increase in the number of
US women suffering from infertility problems is not caused by an increase in the rate
of infertility, but rather due to more women postponing their fertility activities. This
delay of motherhood is prominent among women with higher educational attainment
as well as stronger labour market attachment (Rindfuss, Morgan, and Offutt, 1996).
One possible reason for observing the delay particularly among highly educated
women is the difficulties they face in balancing work and life. Phipps, Burton, and
Lethbridge (2001) document that, on average, women have more job interruptions
than men and 80% of these interruptions are related to motherhood. Since there is a
substantial amount of evidence pointing out possible detrimental impacts of career
interruptions on women’s future wages (for example, see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989;
Altug˘ and Miller, 1998; Korenman and Neumark, 1992), women with high career
10For example, the public system in Denmark offers up to three cycles of In Vitro Fertilization
treatment for free.
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ambitions may be postponing births to advance in their workplaces.
If this is the case, the introductions of state-level infertility insurance mandates
may have induced women to further delay giving birth, since the knowledge of
accessible and affordable infertility treatment may have led women to focus on their
careers for a longer period of their lives and postpone giving birth. Given that
the majority of women who obtain treatment are older and highly educated white
women who have stronger attachment than average to the labour market, such an
argument is rather plausible (Bitler and Schmidt, 2007).
Previous literature on the US infertility insurance mandates has mainly high-
lighted the impact of mandates on the take up and the outcomes of treatment
among an older group of women. This is a logical choice of the age group to study
as women who need and thus access the treatment are often those who are above
35. In contrast, this chapter investigates a potentially unintentional impact among
younger women. In particular, this chapter studies how the U.S. infertility insur-
ance mandates affected the timing of first birth of young women by employing the
framework of event history analysis. The impacts of mandates are identified using
the difference-in-differences approach by comparing the timing of births for women
residing in states with and without the mandates. The main data is taken from the
1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Current Population
Survey (CPS).
The focus on the timing of first birth among younger women is appealing, since
understanding how younger women’s decisions to have a child alter in response to
such finanicial incentives is an interesting question on its own. Moreover, although
these women having the wider choice of birth timing is welfare improving, the in-
crease in the age at first birth is likely to cause various negative health outcomes. For
example, Menken, Trussell, and Larsen (1986) report that delay of birth from the
age group 25-29 to 30-34 increases the proportion of infertile women from 9 to 15%.
First births at older ages are also associated with health risks for both the moth-
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ers and the new born children (the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM), 2003) . The probability of down syndrome increases for birth after 30
and the probabilities of miscarriages and pregnancy complications also increase for
older mothers. The delay would, therefore, be likely to increase the heath care costs
due not only to the higher demand for infertility treatment but also to the more
intensive pre and post-natal care required. Lastly, several of the previous works on
this topic use young women as a control group in order to investigate the impact
of mandates on older women. These papers typically assume that younger women
are unaffected by the introduction of the infertility health insurance mandates. If,
however, younger women are indeed delaying birth, the policy impacts would be
overestimated.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section looks
at background information regarding the U.S. infertility treatment and the health
insurance system as well as the structure of the state mandates. Section 2.3 describes
the theoretical framework and 2.4 looks at the past literature. Section 2.5 and 2.6
each describes the identification strategy and the empirical specification. Section
2.7 presents the data used for the analysis. Section 2.8 and 2.9 describe the results
and robustness analysis respectively. Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Infertility treatment
The initial step taken by couples seeking treatment is the examination of both
partners’ reproductive organs. As a next step, the majority undergo several less
invasive methods such as the use of fertility drugs which induce women to produce
multiple eggs per ovulation. If the cause of infertility is clear, women proceed straight
to surgery in order, for example, to unblock their fallopian tubes. Whilst most
women successfully conceive a child without using more invasive methods, a small
proportion of women proceed to receive treatment via the Assisted Reproductive
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Technologies (ART), which are any treatments that handle either sperms and eggs
or both. Details of these treatments are summarized in Table 2.1.
Although two thirds of couples who seek treatment in the U.S. successfully con-
ceive children, the success rates vary with the age of women. For example, the
pregnancy rates of ART for women aged 29 is 44.9% but this figure drops to 37.6%
for women aged 35 (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005).
Infertility treatments are often very costly. Hormone therapies which are used
to induce the releasing of an egg could cost between $50 and $5,000 per cycle whilst
tubal surgery would cost between $3,000 and $10,000 (see Table 2.1). One of the
most expensive treatments, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) on average costs $12,400
per cycle, although this treatment only accounts for approximately 5% of the U.S.
infertility treatment (ASRM, 2009) . When these treatments are combined or used
for repeated cycles, the financial burden for patients quickly becomes too heavy for
them to continue the infertility treatment.
2.2.2 Structure of health insurance in the United States
High medical cost in the US is covered by various forms of health care insurance.
The US health care insurance can be divided into public and private insurance.
Public or federally funded programs are under the control of federal laws and cur-
rently cover approximately 27% or 85 million individuals that often face difficulties
obtaining private insurance policies (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, Smith, and the Bureau
of the Census, 2008). Private insurance, however, is the relevant insurance for the
purpose of this chapter as the state-level mandates only affect those that are insured
privately.
Private insurance policies are either purchased individually or through employ-
ers under group purchasing agreements. Whilst only 12% of individuals purchase
their own insurance, the majority obtain their coverage through their employers
(DeNavas-Walt et al., 2008). The importance of employer sponsored insurance
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in the U.S. is evident from the sheer number of individuals that are covered by
their employers. However, the increasing cost of medical care in the U.S. has also
posed significant financial difficulties for the employers. As a result, individuals with
employer-sponsored health insurance are likely to be working as full-time employees
in large firms (Sullivan, Miller, Feldman, and Dowd, 1992).
One type of organization which became increasingly important as a cost cut-
ting measure during the period of interest is the Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs). It is a type of managed care organization (MCO), which provides health
care coverage. In this system, the care providers charge a low fee for a health care
service and in return, employers who contract with HMOs ensure a steady inflow
of patients. The introduction of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
forced employers with more than 25 employees to offer federally certified HMO op-
tions as well as traditional indemnity insurance plans when requested. Although
HMOs had only 16% of the market in 1988, this figure increased to 31% by 1996
(Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whitmore, Finder, DiJulio, and Hawkins, 2006). A
large proportion of US women have attained their health insurance coverage through
either their or their dependents’ employers who in turn have their insurance packages
to be administered by HMOs.
2.2.3 Infertility insurance mandates
As a way to provide coverage for the cost of infertility treatment, states individ-
ually implemented insurance mandates between 1977 and 2001 (see Table 2.2 in the
appendix).
The extent of coverage varies across the states and these differences in the gen-
erosity of coverage stem from three main components. Firstly, there are mainly two
types of mandates implemented. “Mandate to cover” regulates insurance compa-
nies to cover the infertility treatment cost regardless of the policy purchased. This
is a stronger form of legislation compared to “Mandate to offer” which requires
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insurance companies to offer the option for consumers to purchase the coverage.
Secondly, some states cover the cost of IVF while the others do not. Although IVF
is not one of the most commonly used treatments, it is the most costly option (see
Table 2.1). As a result, the differential degree of coverage for IVF by each state
creates variations in the generosity of financial support given to couples. Lastly,
some states implemented the mandates for HMOs whilst others excluded them from
the need to cover the treatment costs. As mentioned in the previous section, HMOs
play an increasingly important role in the US health insurance system. States with
mandates which include HMOs, therefore, would be more likely to have a larger
impact on the timing of birth than those without.
One thing to note is the lack of age limits in most states. In fact until after 2000,
no states had any imposition of age restrictions. This is slightly surprising as the
treatment success rate is heavily dependent on the age of the woman. Such lack of
restriction may have acted as another factor to encourage women to delay giving
birth.
2.3 Theoretical framework
Heckman and Willis (1976), illustrate a delay of birth when a couple experience
a steeply rising income profile. They use a dynamic fertility model where individuals
maximize discounted value of utility over her lifetime given a flow budget constraint.
They assume that couples can choose, in any months of the fertile period, the level
of contraception and hence the probability of conception. Under this theoretical
framework, they find that couples sustain a high level of contraception until their
flow of income is sufficiently high to conceive a child. Given this theory, women have
incentives to delay birth in order to minimize the loss of wages, and seeing that their
income profiles would improve due to hard work during their earlier years provide
additional incentive for women to further delay giving birth.
When women determine when to have a child, however, they have another factor
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to consider, namely the biological constraint. Women could postpone giving birth if
they consistently stay fertile. Women’s fecundity, however, declines with age. The
introduction of infertility insurance mandates reduced the price of treatment and
made it possible for women to have a child for a longer period of their lives. As a
result, the policy introductions effectively reduced the opportunity cost of having a
child in the future. Although it is likely that not many women possess knowledge of
the procedures and the costs of various infertility treatments in detail before they try
to conceive through natural method, a study by Hewlett (2004) suggest that women
are aware of the fact that the treatment relaxes their fertility constraint to some
extent. In fact, she suggests that they may be over-estimating the effectiveness of
infertility treatments as approximately 89% of young career driven women believe
that infertility treatment enables them to have a child well into their 40s when
in fact the treatment success rate drops sharply after the age of 35 (the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2003) . Knowing that infertility treatment could
bring them a child together with the knowledge that their health insurance covers
the cost of the treatment in the future, they are presented with an incentive to delay
giving birth.
Although the introduction of mandates reduced the cost of future treatment,
the financial burden faced by the health insurance providers was likely to have
been passed on to the consumers in the form of either reduced wages if individu-
als obtained their insurance through their employers or higher premiums or both.
There are no studies that directly investigated this effect of the infertility insurance
mandates on the insurance premiums. However, several studies used other health
insurance mandates to understand the impact on wages and insurance premiums.
Using 1989 cross sectional data, Acs, Winterbottom, and Zedlewski (1992) note that
the health insurance mandates increased premiums by 4 to 13%. Gruber (1994), on
the other hand, studies how the state maternity mandates introduced in three states
affected the wages, and concludes that the full cost of mandates was paid by women
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aged between 20 and 40.
Such an increase in the premiums reduces the demand for health insurance and
thus the number of individuals affected by the policies are likely to have declined. A
change in wages, on the other hand, generates both income and substitution effects.
The reduction of wages leads women to delay birth due to an income effect. The
substitution effect, however, predicts shortening of birth intervals if childbearing is
complementary to leisure.
In summary, affected women are likely to face opposing incentives when deter-
mining their timing of birth and the evaluation of the policy impact requires an
empirical investigation.
2.4 Literature
The majority of the previous literature has highlighted the impact of the man-
dates on older women. This is a natural choice of group as these are the women
who are more likely to seek treatment. In contrast, this chapter sheds light on how
the mandates changed the fertility timing preferences of younger women when they
take account of the availability of cheaper infertility treatments.
The introductions of mandates are thought to have increased the use of various
infertility treatments and thus are likely to have affected the birth rate. Using 1985-
1999 Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and the Census Bureau, Schmidt (2005;
2007) looks at the policy impacts on the rate of first birth, which is defined as the
proportion of women with particular demographic characteristics giving first birth.
Estimates from a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator show that while the
mandates did not significantly affect all US women, white women who were older
than 35 experienced a significant increase in the rate of first birth (approximately
32%).
Bundorf, Henne and Baker(2007) study how the mandates affected the access
to and the aggressiveness of ART. Due to the high cost of these treatments, women
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may implant multiple embryos per cycle in the hope to increase the success rate and
reduce the number of cycles they need to undergo. However, such action would in-
crease the rate of multiple births which is taxing both for maternal and fetal health.
The reduction in the cost of treatment may have reduced the level of aggressive-
ness and multiple birth rates. Using the 1981-1999 Vital Statistics Natality Birth
Data and the 1989-2000 registry data from the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, they estimate the policy impact using a difference-in-differences esti-
mator and conclude that the mandates increased the utilization of ART, however
the aggressiveness of the treatment did not change even after the introduction of
the mandates.
Bitler (2008), on the other hand, studies whether the mandates changed the rate
of multiple births and the child health outcomes. She employs the 1981-1999 Birth
Certificate Data and the 2000 Decennial Public Use Microdata Sample and 2001-
2002 American Community Service Data, and finds that the probability of a twin
birth increased by 10 to 23%. She also studies how the mandates affected various
health outcomes of the newly born children. In particular, she looks at the impacts
on birth weight, gestation, and 5-minute Apgar score for samples of singleton and
twin births. Although no effect of mandates on these birth outcomes are found for
young women aged below 30, she finds some negative impacts on the birth outcomes
of the twins and singletons among older women.
Whilst these past studies have focused on how the mandates affected an older
group of women, it is also possible that these state mandates influenced women
who were considering a potential use of treatment in the future. In other words,
the introduction of mandates may have encouraged younger women to delay giving
birth. If women in the mandated states were indeed delaying their timing of birth,
findings from Schmidt (2005; 2007) and Bundorf et al. (2007) not only show increase
in the number of first births due to more easily accessible treatment but also reflects
more women at older ages giving birth because of their planned delay of birth. This
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interpretation also fits with the results presented by Bitler (2008). The negative
birth outcomes found among older women may be due to more women giving birth
at a later age. This in turn highlights the importance of studying the timing of birth
effect.
Similarly to the present paper, Buckles (2007) investigates whether women de-
layed births in response to these policies. Using the 1982-1999 Current Population
Survey, she first looks at how the first birth rates of older women aged between 35
and 44 changed before and after the introduction of mandates using a difference-in-
differences estimator and finds that women residing in mandated states increased
the first birth rate by approximately 40% after five years of coverage. She, however,
argues that estimates may simply be picking up the ability of older women to give
birth due to the increasing availability of infertility treatment over time. In order
to identify the cause of the delay, she then looks at how the birth rates of younger
women were affected. The estimates suggest that women aged between 22 and 25
as well as 26 and 30 both decreased the birth rates by approximately 26% after five
years of coverage. Bundolf et al. (2007) also devotes a small section to this issue
and presents similar difference-in-differences estimates which indicate that the birth
rate of women aged 25-29 decreased while it increased for women aged 35-39.11
Although the evidence presented by Buckles (2007) and Bundolf et al. (2007)
indicates a potential delaying effect of the mandates, they both assume that the
behavior of the older cohort of women proxies for that of the younger cohort in
10 or 20 years time. Given that the lifestyles of women changed drastically over
the period of observation, this may be a rather strong assumption. Moreover, the
repeated cross sectional data only allows one to observe the fertility activity until
the interview date and thus makes it difficult to investigate whether these young
individuals are delaying births or simply not having any children at all. As a result,
11There is another work-in-progress research on this topic by Machado and Sanz-de-Galdeano,
which was presented in the 2010 American Society for Health Economists in Cornell University.
They also investigate the impact of the US infertility health insurance mandates on the timing of
first birth using repeated cross sectional data.
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one may obtain an even stronger understanding of the policy impact by following how
the same women responded to the mandates at different points of their lives. This
chapter, hence, proposes to use the framework of duration analysis using longitudinal
data in order to investigate how the mandates affected the timing of birth.
2.5 Identification strategies
Special care is needed when studying the timing of birth using longitudinal data.
Firstly, unlike other subjects of economic studies such as unemployment, a woman
gives birth to the first child only once in her life time. As a result, we fail to observe
the timing of first birth of the same individual with and without the policy even
with the availability of longitudinal data. Secondly, women’s lifestyle and fertility
behavior changed drastically over the sample years.
Taking account of the first point, it is necessary to compare the influence of
the mandates on the timing of birth across individuals over time. However, the
second point raises a concern that one cohort of women observed in later years are
not comparable to those from earlier years. Instead, I attempt to identify the policy
impact by defining a comparison group which includes women are residing in the non-
mandated states. These women have similar demographic characteristics to those
women who were living in the mandated states but were unaffected by the policies.
By comparing the timing of birth of women in mandated and non-mandated states,
the policy impact is uncovered by evaluating the change in differences before and
after the policy introduction dates. I, therefore, employ a difference-in-differences
estimator exploiting the variation in exposure to cheaper infertility treatment across
both states and time.
2.6 Empirical specifications
This chapter carries out the analysis using the 1980-1979 Panel Study of Income
D. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) records birth month and year
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of children born to women in the core sample. Due to the grouped nature of the
data and the flexibility to incorporate a nonparametric baseline hazard, this chapter
employs a discrete-time proportional hazard model. This section follows materials
from Jenkins (2005).
The underlying continuous-time hazard, which is the conditional hazard rate of
having a first child, for the ith individual at time j is given by
θi(j|x, β) = λ(j)exp[xi(j)′β] (2.1)
λ(j) is the baseline hazard and xi(j) denotes covariates to control for the ith
individual’s characteristics. In this chapter, j is measured in age years, and the
discrete nature of the PSID data implies that a birth is recorded to have been given
in the jth age if she gave birth on the continuous time scale of between (j − 1) and
j. The discrete hazard function, thus, characterizes the probability of first birth by
the jth age provided that she has not yet given birth by the j − 1th age.
hi(j|xi(j)) = P [T = j|T > j − 1, xi(j)]
= 1− exp[−
∫ j
j−1
θi(s)ds]
= 1− exp[−exp(xi(j)′β +Mandatei(j − 2)′δ + γ(j))]
(2.2)
where
γ(j) = ln[
∫ j
j−1
λ(s)ds] (2.3)
.
In order to allow the baseline hazard to be flexible, a piece-wise constant specifi-
cation is chosen. By fitting a period specific indicator variable, the baseline hazard
is allowed to vary across periods. As discussed in Chapter 1, the baseline hazard
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captures the differential hazard rates that are caused by the lengths of childless peri-
ods prior to the observed birth. The vector of parameters γ(j) captures the baseline
hazard. The covariate vector xi(j) is assumed to be time-invariant within an interval
but changes across intervals. xi(j) contains individual and state-level characteristics,
a time-invariant Policy dummy that picks up states which introduced the infertility
insurance mandates. The most important variable for our analysis is Mandatei(j).
It is an indicator variable that equals one if the individual was residing in a state
where the mandate had been introduced for at least two years. This definition allows
individuals two years to respond to the introduction of mandates.12 To illustrate
how this variable is defined, consider a woman who is living in Connecticut and is
included in the sample from year 1985. Since Connecticut introduced its mandate
in 1989, Mandatei(j) would be 0 for this individual for the first seven years of ob-
servation and equals 1 from 1991 onwards. The dummy equals to 1 only from 1991
in order to allow women additional two years to respond to the introduction of the
mandates. If another woman in the same state is included in the sample from 1989,
her Mandatei(j) would equal to 0 for the first two periods and 1 in the subsequent
periods . In a usual framework of difference-in-differences, this dummy variable
is the interaction between the Policy dummy and another dummy that indicates
years after policies are introduced. The coefficient δ captures the policy impact
which is identified by taking the differences in ln[−ln(1− hi(j|xi(j)))] between the
two groups of states and evaluating the change in these differences before and after
the introduction of mandates.
The discrete hazard function specified in Eq. (2.2) allows the set of covariates,
and importantly the Mandate dummy, to proportionally affect the baseline hazard
function. The shape of the baseline hazard, however, is common between the two
groups. Since the focus of this chapter is to identify how long women delayed their
first birth, an alternative hazard specification is given by
12Additional analysis allowing for three years of exposure did not change the findings discussed
here.
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hi(j|xi(j)) = P [T = j|T > j − 1, xi(j)]
= 1− exp[−
∫ j
j−1
θi(s)ds]
= 1− exp[−exp(xi(j)′β + γ(j) +Mandatei(j)× α(j))].
(2.4)
Eq. (2.4) specifies flexible duration dependence by treatment status. Given the
above specification, the discrete survival function is
Si(j|xi(j)) =
j∏
k=1
(1− hi(k)) (2.5)
Let ci be an indicator variable that equals one if the spell is censored (i.e. the
individual reaches the end of observation period without having any children). The
contribution of the ith individual to the likelihood function is
Li = [P (Ti = j)]
1−ci [P (Ti > j)]ci
= [hi(j)Si(j − 1)]1−ci [
j∏
k=1
(1− hi(k))]ci
= [
hi(j)
1− hi(j)
j∏
k=1
(1− hi(k))]1−ci [
j∏
k=1
(1− hi(k))]ci
= [(
hi(j)
1− hi(j))
1−ci
j∏
k=1
(1− hi(k))]
(2.6)
The above analysis does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. However,
Lancaster(1980) and Van den Berg (2001) point out that uncontrolled unobserved
heterogeneity would cause spurious negative duration dependence as those with
higher hazards tend to exit first. By taking account of the unobserved heterogeneity,
the discrete hazard functions with the unobserved heterogeneity are given by
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hi(j|xi(j), i) = P [T = j|T > j − 1, xi(j), i]
= 1− exp[−
∫ j
j−1
θi(s)ds]
= 1− exp[−exp(xi(j)′β +Mandatei(j)′δ + γ(j) + i)].
(2.7)
and
hi(j|xi(j), i) = P [T = j|T > j − 1, xi(j), i]
= 1− exp[−
∫ j
j−1
θi(s)ds]
= 1− exp[−exp(xi(j)′β + γ(j) +Mandatei(j)× α(j) + i)].
(2.8)
where i is the unobserved heterogeneity.
Assuming that the density function, f(i), follows a gamma distribution, the
likelihood function is marginalised with respect to the unobservables. The choice of
a gamma distribution as the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is rather conve-
nient as all the relevant functions have closed form solutions. Moreover, Abbring and
Van den Berg (2007) showed that when the unobserved heterogeneity is specified
to proportionally affect the hazard, the unobserved heterogeneity distribution con-
verges rapidly to a gamma distribution.13 The likelihood contribution for a person
with a spell length j, therefore, is
Li =
∫
[(
hi(j)
1− hi(j))
1−ci
j∏
k=1
(1− hi(k))]f(i)di (2.9)
13Another possible approach is to use the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator which
fits an arbitrary distribution of unobserved frailty approximated by a set of mass points and the
probability of a person at each mass point ((Heckman and Singer, 1984)). However, Baker and
Melino (2000), through a Monte Carlo experiment, showed that estimating both flexible duration
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity leads to a significant bias in the parameters of these
components. They identify the cause of this bias to be the nonparametric maximum likelihood
estimator (NPMLE) to find too many spurious mass points.
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.2.7 Data
The main data used for the analysis is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal dataset and
the data is collected both at the individual and family level. The number of house-
holds surveyed initially in 1968 was 4,800 but the sample size increased to 7,000
households by 2000 as the children of initial core sample members left households to
establish their own families. From 1973, interviews were conducted over the phone
and computer assisted phone surveys were introduced from 1993.
While repeated cross-sectional data have attractive features such as the large
number of births and sample size, panel data presents us with several advantages.
One major merit is the ability of longitudinal data to follow the same individuals.
This characteristic is a crucial feature for our analysis for three reasons. Firstly,
the main focus of this chapter is to see how women changed their fertility behavior
over time. Secondly, identifying the policy impacts requires one to know whether
women stayed in a particular state long enough for the mandates to have had some
impacts on their timing of birth. From the cross sectional data, it is not possible to
unveil this information as they only reveal in which state the individual was residing
in at the time of interview. Lastly, fertility histories of women can reasonably be
recovered from earlier waves. This ensures a correct selection of women, namely
those without any children, into the sample.
The main period of observation is chosen to be between 1980 and 1997. As shown
in Table 2.2, most states introduced the mandates between mid 1980s and early
1990s. The period of observation, therefore, allows us to observe how the fertility
behavior changed over years in response to the mandates. The year 1997 is chosen
as the end of the observation period, since the frequency of PSID data collection
changed from annually to every other year after 1997. The reduced frequency of data
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collection is problematic for the analysis, since information on the state of residence
would be missing for the year that was not collected.14
Observations are organized in a person-year format. This implies that the same
individual appears in the sample as many years until she either gives birth to her
first child or she reaches the end of the observation period without giving birth. The
width of the step, a year, is decided in order to impose less parametric structure
on the baseline hazard whilst having enough birth observations. The focus of this
chapter is to identify the policy impacts on women’s timing of birth, and so a cohort
of women who turned between 20 and 30 anytime during the observation period are
included in the sample.
Some women in the PSID moved to different states during the observation period.
These women have likely experienced limited influence from the mandates as their
stay in a mandated state was short. It is, therefore, rather difficult to determine
whether they should be included in the treatment or the control groups as such short
stays may or may not be sufficient for individuals to be affected by the mandates.
As a result, only women who did not move are included in the sample.15 After
selecting groups of individuals for the analysis, the number of individuals in the
sample became 2685 contributing 10829 observations.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the individual
gave first birth in a particular year. The demographic variables included are char-
acteristics that are likely to affect fertility decisions such as women’s educational
level, ethnicity, age at the start of the observation period and its squared term. The
14Additional regression is estimated using data from 1980 to 2005 for robustness check. Indi-
viduals recorded to have resided in the same state before and after the missing years are assumed
to have not moved across states. Although the conclusion remain the same, the magnitude of the
estimates are smaller when additional years of observations are included. One possible explanation
for this finding is that individuals moved across states during the years when interviews were not
carried out. As a result, the mandated group may have included individuals who did not stay in
the mandated state long enough to be affected, thus diluting the effect. The results are available
upon request.
15Even when these movers are included, the general conclusion remains the same but the es-
timated policy effect is less significant. Such reduction in the significance level may be due to
the inclusion of individuals who moved for reasons other than the mandates in the affected group
diluting the effect. The results are available upon request.
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regional and year dummies as well as state-level economic characteristics are also
included in order to allow for differential characteristics across regions and years.
These economic characteristics also control for the level of labour demand during
the period of observation.16 17 During the 17 year period being considered in the
analysis, female labour force participation increased and women’s lifestyles and pref-
erences drastically changed. Moreover, availability of infertility treatment increased
over years. As a result, individuals from later periods are more likely to give birth at
an older age. In order to control for this differential fertility timing over the years,
cohort dummies that take account of in which year women entered the sample are
included. Marital status is not controlled in these regressions, since the status is
likely to be jointly determined with fertility.
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of the PSID sample used in this chap-
ter. The first two columns show the average characteristics of women residing in
mandated and non-mandated states separately prior to the introduction of the man-
dates (i.e. 1970-1980). The third and fourth columns also show the statistics of the
two groups from 1980-1997.
Comparing the statistics, these two groups of women have similar averages in
most variables. However, there are minor differences in their characteristics. For
example, there seems to be a higher concentration of black women in the non-
mandated states throughout the period of 1970-1997. Moreover, women in mandated
states are more highly educated.
The identification strategy in this chapter requires the exogenous introduction of
the mandates. The employed estimator would eliminate the differences in the fertil-
ity behavior between the two groups of women as long as they experience the same
trend. If, however, states introduced their policies due to the increasing demand for
16The state-level economic indicators are calculated using the 1980-1997 March Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). CPS is a repeated cross-sectional survey collecting information from over
50,000 households.
17The regressions shown in this chapter only include regional level dummies due to the lim-
ited number of observations in some states. However, the results remain unchanged even when
additional regressions are estimated using state fixed effect.
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treatment, the demographic characteristics, and more importantly, birth trends of
the two groups of women would differ. The violation of this assumption would bias
the reported estimates and they would instead reflect both the policy impact as well
as differential trends in fertility behavior of women.
To investigate if the disparities in the observed average characteristics translates
into differential birth trends, Figure 2.1 display the trends of age at first birth during
the pre-policy period 1970 and 1985 by mandate status and race. These trends
are calculated by using the 1970-1985 NCHS’s Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data
which collects birth information via US birth certificates. Although there seem to
be constant differences between those residing in states with and without mandates
for both races, this figure indicates no disparities in trends between the two groups
of women regardless of race.
Additionally, Figure 2.2 displays various economic characteristics such as top
10% income, median income, unemployment rates and female labour force partici-
pation during the pre-policy period for the treatment and control groups separately.
Since highly educated women are the primary users of the infertility treatment, dif-
ferential trends in economic characteristics would likely to unveil potential difference
in the demand for treatment. These trends of economic characteristics are estimated
using the 1977-1985 Current Population Survey (CPS).18 Again, all economic char-
acteristics indicate common trends between the two groups for all statistics.
Although raw data suggests a common trend among women residing in mandated
and non-mandated states, additional robustness checks are carried out in order to
further ensure comparability of women in these two states in Section 2.9.
18The duration of the CPS statistics is shorter as the data only reports the break down of the
region of residences from 1977 onwards.
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2.8 Results
2.8.1 Graphical analysis using the life table survival functions
The life table survival rates are plotted in Figure 2.3 for women with and without
the exposure to the mandates. Points on these lines Iindicate the proportion of
women remaining childless until a particular age. The left hand side figure shows
the estimates when the entire sample is used while the figure in the middle presents
estimates of women with more than 13 years of education. Moreover, since white
women have more access to health insurance and thus are more likely to be affected
by these mandates (Bitler and Schmidt, 2007), the right hand side figure presents
the estimates for highly educated white women. All of the three figures indicate
that women affected by the mandates remain childless until later stages of their
lives. The observed delay seems to be more pronounced for the group of highly
educated white women above the age of 30.
2.8.2 Regression analysis
Turning to the regression estimates, the discrete-time proportional hazard model
with gamma unobserved heterogeneity given in Eq. (2.2) is estimated and the results
are presented in Table 2.4. This specification allows for a vertical shift of the baseline
hazard function proportionally to the set of demographic characteristics, but the
shape of the baseline hazard function is unaltered across groups of individuals. The
estimates presented in Table 2.4, therefore, show the scaling factor of the baseline
hazard function. The standard errors in the parenthesis are bootstrapped to take
account of the state-level clustering.
The “Mandate” dummy selects a subgroup of women from the affected group.
In particular, it picks out women from the group of affected women who were living
in a state and had already been exposed to the mandates for at least two years.
Its coefficient, therefore, measures the policy impact of the mandates. A negative
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coefficient implies a delay of birth as it indicates a smaller probability of first birth.
The first column in Table 2.4 shows the estimates when the treatment and con-
trol groups are defined as all women in mandated states and non-mandated states
respectively.19 The estimate of the policy impact (i.e. coefficient of the “mandate”
dummy) from the first column is insignificant and positive and shows no impact of
the mandates.
Considering that the state-level mandates affected women with private health
insurance, highly educated white women are more likely to be exposed to the policies
(Bitler and Schmidt, 2007). Moreover, this group of women may face higher needs
to delay birth in order to balance work and life. Reflecting this point, columns
(2) to (4) in Table 2.4 presents the policy impact separately by various levels of
educational attainment. Column (2) shows the estimated impact of women with 10
to 12 years of education. Column (3), on the other hand, presents results of women
who attained 13 years or more education. Due to the limitations of the sample size,
13 years of education, which implies first year of undergraduate degree, is used as an
indicator for selecting highly educated women. Results suggest differential impacts
of mandates by educational attainment. As expected, significant negative policy
impact are observed only for the highly educated women. Women with 10-12 years
of education shortened the time until first birth instead. To see how white women
are affected, column (4) in Table 2.4 presents estimates for highly educated white
women only. Since this is a demographic group that is most likely to purchase health
insurance, we expect to observe stronger impact from these women. As expected,
the estimate in the last column is larger when only highly educated white women
are included.20
19The estimated coefficients of other covariates are given in Table 9.
20Due to the small sample size of black women, the results reported in columns (1) to (3) are
estimated assuming that white and black women went through similar experiences and the that
differences between the two groups stem from the constant racial factor which proportionally affects
the baseline hazard. This may be a rather strong assumption, however, Figure 2.1 show very similar
trends between the white and black women. Moreover, although not reported in this chapter,
additional regressions were estimated by interacting the policy impact dummy, Mandatei(j − 2),
with racial characteristics. These results indicate that highly educated black women are affected
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Estimates in Table 2.4 merely show how the baseline hazard function is shifted by
a constant scale due to the introduction of the mandates. It is, however, very likely
that the affected women exhibit a different baseline hazard over years in response to
the mandates. As a result, Eq. (2.8) is estimated for highly educated women where
the baseline hazard functions are separately estimated for those who were unaffected
by the mandates and those who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years.
Table 2.5 presents the estimated baseline hazard coefficients where the width of a
period is a year. Since the baseline hazard can only be estimated when there are
birth observations, some periods are combined assuming that the hazard rates are
constant between the two periods. The first column shows γ(t) for individuals who
are unaffected by the mandates. The estimates of interests, however, are shown in
the second column. These estimates present differences in the baseline hazard rates
between the two groups. They suggest that when exposed to the mandates for at
least two years, individuals exhibit lower probabilities of birth continuously until
the 5th period.
To better illustrate how the conditional probability of giving birth to first child
changed over years, Figure 2.4 plots the predicted hazard functions. These figures
present white highly educated women’s predicted conditional probability of having
a first child. The left figure illustrates how affected women would exhibit differential
trends if they were exposed to the mandates for two years by the time they turned
20 conditional on not having a first child until this age. Similarly, the middle and
right hand side figures present the trends for women who were affected for two years
by the age of 25 and 30 respectively. In all figures, the plotted predicted hazard
functions clearly indicate initial lower conditional probabilities of first birth among
women affected by the policies. The differences in the probabilities between the two
groups are relatively constant until the fifth year.
The plotted predicted survival functions can be found in Figure 2.5. Each point
in a very similar manner to white women although the sizes of the impacts are smaller.
78
on these lines indicates the probability of remaining childless until a particular age.
The thin lines show these probabilities for women who were unaffected by the man-
dates and the thick lines indicate those women who were exposed to the policies
for at least two years at a particular age. It now becomes clearer that women who
were exposed to the mandates for two years by the age of 30 exhibit a greater delay
of first birth compared to those who were 20 or 25. For example, when we look at
the middle figure, 50% of the unaffected women were still childless at the age of 27
whilst 50% of those who were affected remain childless until the age of 28.5. On
the other hand, we observe approximately a 2 year delay among women who were
affected by the mandates at the age of 30 (from the age of 35 to 37). Since, less than
50% of women gave birth in the left figure, it is not possible to compare the years
of delay at the median for women who were exposed to the mandates for two years
by the age of 20. However, the gap is narrowing around the median, suggesting a
smaller delay.
Next, Table 2.6 shows estimated policy impacts by the differential coverage of
the mandates. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, each individual state adopted mandates
of varying levels of generosity. If women were aware of the details of the mandates,
we would expect to observe more delay among women residing in states with more
generous cost coverage. The estimates presented here, however, are likely to lack
precision due to the small sample size. There are only 1180 observations of highly
educated women and the analysis using subsamples of theses women exacerbate the
small sample size problem further. This is particularly problematic when estimat-
ing the policy impact of weak mandates as states that introduced weak mandates
are typically only 3-5 out the 15 mandated states. Interpretation of these results,
therefore, must be done with caution.
Looking at the results in column (1) of Table 2.6, highly educated women seem
to respond to “Mandate to cover” more strongly by significantly delaying first birth.
Since “Mandate to cover” is a more generous policy compared to “Mandate to offer”,
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this result matches with the prediction. Column (2), on the other hand, provides
results that do not conform to the theoretical prediction. When the mandates
include IVF coverage, the estimated delay is significant. However, the size of the
delay seems to be larger, albeit insignificant, when IVF is not covered. In Column(3)
the impacts of mandates regulating all insurance firms are compared to those that
exempts some firms. Here again, women exposed to weaker mandates are responding
more strongly by delaying birth.
Although the problem of the limited sample size is clearly evident in the larger
standard errors among the estimated impacts for the weak mandates, further analy-
sis is required to see if the results reflect factors other than the policy introductions.
States that are included in both the “No IVF” and “Not all insurance firms”
groups are New York, Montana and West Virginia. Out of these three states, New
York is the largest and is thus likely to be dominating the results. There are several
potential reasons why women in New York may exhibit significant delay. One pos-
sibility is that women in New York have more access to fertility clinics compared to
women in other states. However, the annual ART Success Rates Reports published
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that other states such as
California and Illinois and Texas also all have equally many fertility clinics. Another
potential explanation is that these women are inherently different from the others
and that they would have delayed birth even in the absence of the mandates. This
would be the case, for example, if these women are more career driven prior to the
introduction of the mandates and thus had strong tendencies to delay birth. If this
is true, the estimated policy impacts do not reflect the results of the introduction
of the mandates but simply highlight the differences between women in New York
and the non-mandated states.
To investigate this issue further, regressions excluding New York are run to see
the size of impact New York has on the estimates. In Column (4), IVF covered
states excluding New York are compared to the states which excludes IVF. The
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size of the estimates are now smaller, although the “No IVF” states still seem to
suggest a delaying impact. On the other hand, Column (5) reports estimates of “All
insurance firms” versus “Not all insurance firms” (excluding New York). Again, New
York does seem to affect the size of the estimate, but the “Not all firms” mandate
coefficient is still negative and significant. From these results, New York seems to
be one of the factors contributing to the large negative estimates of the weaker
mandates, but is not the only cause.
The results in this section imply that women who were affected by the mandates
exhibit approximately 1-2 years of delay depending on the age at which they were
affected. Although plagued by small sample size problem, further analyses on the
impact of mandates by differential coverage suggest potential differences other than
the mandate introductions in women who were in the mandated and non-mandated
states.
2.9 Robustness checks
The previous section presented evidence of delay in the timing of birth in response
to the introduction of the state infertility health insurance mandates. This section
describes an additional analysis that is carried out to ensure the robustness of the
findings.
2.9.1 Analysis of the plausibility of the results
The estimated delay from the previous section suggests 1-2 years of delay in the
timing of birth, which seems to be large. To see the plausibility of these results,
Figure 2.6 plots trends of the average age at first births for highly educated white
women in the non-mandated and mandated states between 1980-1997. These trends
are calculated using the 1980-1997 NCHS’s Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. To
ensure that only states that are actually affected by the mandates contribute to
the average, the mandated states include states from the year of enactment. For
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example, New York is included in the non-mandated group until 1989 and is defined
as the mandated state only from 1990, which was the year New York enacted its
mandate.
These figures indicate that women in both groups of states experienced increases
in the age at first birth during this period. However, the size of the delay is larger for
women in the mandated states. In particular, whilst women in non-mandated states
increased their age at first birth by approximately 1.5 years, those women residing
in the mandated states went through an increase of 3.5 years. These raw statistics
suggest delaying of approximately 3 more years among the women in mandated
states compared to those in the non-mandated states. The national statistics, thus,
support the estimated delay reported in the previous section.
2.9.2 Test for the identification assumption
Identification strategy employed in this chapter requires that the infertility in-
surance mandates are exogenously introduced. If, instead, these mandates were
introduced in response to greater demands for infertility treatment, the employed
identification strategy would not reveal the policy impact. However, there are two
main reasons to believe that the introduction of the mandates do not directly reflect
the demand for infertility treatment.
Firstly, insurance mandates were popular in the US between 1970s and 1990s.
In fact, Jensen and Morrisey (1999) showed that the number of mandates increased
by 25 folds during this period from 35 to 860.21 Jensen and Morrisey (1999) also
argued that the philosophy towards health insurance mandates differed significantly
across states, and a state with a large number of mandates is more likely to pass
new insurance mandates. 22 This fact seems to suggest the state-level preference
21One of the policies that could also contribute to the delaying of birth is the mandate to cover
for contraceptive methods. However, such mandates only came in effect from 1998. Maternity
leave policies are also likely to be important when studying the timing of births. The first paid
maternity leave was introduced in California in 2002. As our analysis only covers up until 1997,
the estimated results are free of the influences from these policies.
22Lambert and McGuire (1990) also show that the states with many mandates were more likely
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towards insurance mandates rather than the demand for infertility treatment as a
driving force behind the enactments of the mandates.
Secondly, the lobbying activity for the infertility insurance mandates is mainly
carried out by a non-profit organization, RESOLVE (Fulwider, 2009). RESOLVE
actively seeks coverage for infertility treatment on local, state and national levels.
It is founded in 1974 and run by a group of volunteers broadly consisting of both
health care professionals and individuals who have had personal experiences with
infertility and/or adoption. Although there is a concern that RESOLVE’s choice
of states is driven by the underlying demand for the infertility treatment within a
state, there are several other states, where the lobbying activities took place but
were not fruitful. Examples of these states include Virginia , which went through
6 attempts to enact the infertility mandate since 1990 (Audit and of the Virginia
General Assembly, 2008), as well as Florida that holds the second largest number of
infertility clinics in the US (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2000).
Other such states also include Nebraska, Michigan, Maine, Pennsylvania, Arizona,
Maryland, Missouri, Kansas, Michigan and Oklahoma.
The existence of these states with unsuccessful attempts highlights the poten-
tial importance of several factors other than the demand for infertility treatment,
namely the opposition forces from the health insurance providers as well as the
concerns among the policymakers regarding the moral ethics involved with the in-
fertility treatment. Indeed, the two case studies in the state of Illinois and Nevada
carried out by Fulwider (2009) reveal that the main debates among the policymakers
regarding the passing of the infertility insurance bill involved the potential cost of
the mandate towards the health insurance providers and employers. In addition,
some senators raised the issues of moral and ethical dilemma associated with infer-
tility treatment. These policymarkers argued that ART procedure resembles that of
selective abortion, since it involves selections of eggs for the purpose of implantation
to introduce a new mandate for mental health.
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and abortions in the case of multiple pregnancies.
The background information strongly suggests that the infertility mandates were
exogenously introduced. Nonetheless, Table 2.7 presents results from a placebo test,
where Eq. (2.7) is estimated using the pre-policy period 1970-1985 PSID data. Look-
ing at a pre-introduction period assures similarities in fertility behavior between the
affected and not affected groups and hence ensures the robustness of the identifi-
cation strategy. Since all except for West Virginia introduced their mandates after
1985, the period of observation presents women’s fertility behavior in the absence of
the policy interventions. Moreover, by the year 1985, various infertility treatments
were already available. The selected period, therefore, allows us to see if highly
educated women had differential preferences towards their birth timings when var-
ious treatments could be purchased without the health insurance coverage. Since
West Virginia had already introduced the mandate in 1977, it is excluded from the
estimation. The result from column (1) are reassuring with regard to the exogeneity
of the policy introductions as the coefficient on the Mandate dummy is small and
statistically insignificant. In addition, Figure 2.7 plots the predicted hazard func-
tions by treatment status and clearly indicates that these two groups exhibited a
very similar trend in the absence of mandates.
Although the robustness checks so far seem to indicate no differences in the
timing of birth between mandated and non-mandated states, estimated results in
Section 2.8 raised a concern that there may be underlying differences between women
residing in states with weak mandates and the others. If these women were indeed
inherently different from the others, it is likely to observe the differential birth
trends even before the introduction of the mandates. In order to test this, policy
impacts are separately estimated for differential coverage. However, even when the
policy variables are estimated separately by those living in “Mandate to cover” and
“Mandate to offer”, no evidence of differences prior to the introductions of mandates
are found (column (2)). Moreover, estimated results are generally small, positive and
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insignificant and thus does not indicate any differences between the states with and
without the IVF coverage(column (3)). Additionally, column (4) presents results for
states that regulated all firms to follow the mandated states vs those that excluded
some insurance firms. Again, there are no differential timing of birth prior to the
introduction of these mandates.
2.9.3 Test for the assumptions in the empirical specification
Individuals who are found to be in the initial period at the age of 20 were likely
to have faced different hazard rates compared to those who were aged 25 at the
start of the observation period. In this chapter, it is assumed that such differences
are controlled for by the inclusion of the initial age variable. In other words, the
differences in the initial condition are assumed to be reflected in the proportional
alteration of the baseline hazard. At the same time, this implies an additional
assumption that the differences in the initial condition can be controlled for solely
by observed characteristics.
In order to test for these assumptions, only individuals who enter the sample at
the age of 20 are included. This makes sure that every woman is found to be in the
initial period under the same condition. However, this reduces the sample size. As
a result, observations with one or two missing years during the sample period are
still included, filling these missing observations as long as their region of residence
before and after the missing years are the same. This is likely to reduce the size of
the estimates if women were moving during these unobserved years for reasons other
than the mandates. On the contrary, this may amplify the size of the estimates if
people moved to take advantage of the mandates.
Although the lack of observations restricts our analysis only to those who were
affected from the age of 20, the results presented in Table 2.8 confirm the conclusion
drawn in Section 2.8. Just as the results in Table 2.5, the coefficients in the second
column, which show the differences in the hazard rate in each period between those
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who are affected and unaffected, indicate a delay of birth until the 5th period.
Moreover, just as before, the differences are statistically significant in periods 2 and
4. Additionally, we now observe a significant reduction in the hazard also in the
5th period. Figure 2.8 presents the survival functions which are plotted using the
estimates from Table 2.8. This figure suggests approximately a year delay at the
median. The size of the delay is similar to the result in the main analysis for those
who were affected from the age of 20 (see the left side figure in Figure 2.5).
2.10 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the impact of the US infertility state mandates on
the timing of first birth. A discrete-time proportional hazard model is estimated
allowing for a flexible nonparametric baseline hazard as well as gamma unobserved
heterogeneity.
In contrast to the past literature, which has focused on how these mandates
affected older women, the present paper looks at policy impacts on younger women.
In other words, while women who undergo infertility treatment are generally older,
it proposes the existence of a potential effect on younger cohorts of women who were
likely to have been planning to have a child in the future. Facing the difficulties
in balancing work and life, these women may have incorporated the availability of
cheap and thus more accessible infertility treatment into their life cycle plan. If this
is the case, we should observe a delay in the time to first birth among the affected
women.
The results from the discrete-time proportional hazard model indicate an in-
significant effect of the mandates when the entire sample is included and the effect
is assumed to be the same across educational group. However, a significant nega-
tive effect of these mandates on the timing of first birth is observed among white
women with more than 13 years of education. Moreover, when separate baseline
hazard functions are estimated, evidence suggests that individuals affected by the
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mandates for at least two years were delaying birth. Moreover, the size of the delay
depended on the age at which these women became exposed to the mandates. For
example, at the median of the survival function, affected white women are estimated
to have delayed their first birth for 1 year if they were exposed to the legislation
for two years by the the age of 20 or 25. The size of delay becomes even larger
when they were affected at the age of 30. In particular, these women are observed
to have delayed their first birth for 2 years. The estimated policy impact translates
to approximately a 14% increase in the number of women who face infertility. This
implies an increase of approximately 0.37 million infertile women.
There are two potential explanations for why we observe stronger impacts among
the women exposed to the mandates at older ages. Firstly, the older childless women
had already delayed birth possibly for career or educational reasons and thus are
likely to be the sample of women who had a stronger incentives to delay birth in
order to balance work and life. Secondly, the notion of pregnancy and timing of
birth is likely to be more of a serious issue for women who were at the age of 28
than those who were younger.
Results broken down by the level of coverage indicated that women in weaker
mandated states seem to be responding more strongly by delaying birth. This raises
a concern as it may indicate an underlying cause of the delay observed other than
the state-level infertility health insurance mandates. However, the small sample
size, reflected in the large standard errors, raises a concern over the precision of the
estimates.
In order to confirm no differential trends between the affected and unaffected
groups, robustness checks were carried out using the pre-policy period (1970-1985)
data. If affected women were different from the other women, such differences are
likely to be observed prior to the introduction of the mandates. However, no matter
how we divide the sample, we observe no differences between the two groups of
women and thus indicating the robustness of the delaying effect found in this chapter.
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Two further assumptions regarding the initial conditions of individuals in the
sample are tested by using only those women who turned 20 at the beginning of
the observation period. Although the smaller sample size only allows us to study
the effect among individuals who were affected for two years by the age of 20, the
results from this sample draws the same conclusion as those in the main analysis.
This chapter demonstrate that the introduction of infertility insurance state
mandates not only affected those who are directly targeted, but had a wider policy
impact on the timing of birth. Further research is needed in order to uncover how
the timing of second birth was affected by these mandates. Due to the delay of
first birth, women may have had their second child significantly after the age of 35
further increasing the health risks for both mothers and children. Moreover, such
an analysis would inform us as to whether the infertility health insurance mandates
affected the total fertility rate.
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2.11 Chapter Two: Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Trends of mean age at first birth by mandate status and race
19
20
21
22
23
24
1970 1975 1980 1985
Year
Non-mandated states (White) Mandated states (White)
Non-mandated states (Black) Mandated states (Black)
Notes: This figure presents the trends of age at first birth by race and mandates status. Statistics are calculated for the period prior to the
introduction of mandates (1970-1985). The ages at first birth are computed using the NCHS’s Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data.
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Figure 2.8: Robustness check: survival functions (White and highly educated
women)
 
Notes: Above figure presents the survival functions of white highly educated women when 
only those who turned 20 are included in the sample. The figure compares the survival rates 
of unaffected women and women who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years by 
the age of 18. Points on these lines indicate the probabilities of remaining childless until a 
particular age. The thin lines show these probabilities for women who were unaffected by the 
mandates and the thick lines indicate those women who were exposed to the policies for at 
least two years at a particular age. These probabilities are estimated using the discrete-time 
proportional hazard estimates with piece-wise constant baseline hazard and gamma 
unobserved heterogeneity. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. The estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in Table 8 and 
Table 9.  
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Table 2.1: Treatment options, success rates and costs
Treatment Description Success rates Cost Multiple births 
Fertility Drugs Regulate reproductive 
hormones and trigger the 
release of more eggs per 
cycle. 
20-60 percent (often 
with IUI) 
Clomipihene:  Minimum 
$50 per cycle 
 
Gonadotropins:$2000-
$5000 including tests, 
drugs and medical check 
ups. 
Yes (8-10 
percent twin rate 
for Clompihene, 
15 percent for 
Gonadotrophin) 
Surgery Unblocking the fallopian 
tubes or removing 
endometrial scarring, 
fibroids, or ovarian 
cysts. 
40-60 percent (if treated 
for endometriosis and 
scar tissues) 
 
10-90 percent (if treated 
for blocked fallopian 
tubes) 
$3,000- $10,000   
Intrauterine 
insemination (IUI) 
A concentrated dose of 
sperm is injected into the 
uterus or fallopian tubes 
with a catheter. 
5 to 20 percent $300-$700 ($1,500-$4,000 
including medication and 
ultrasound monitoring). 
Yes if fertility 
drug is also used 
in conjunction to 
this method. 
In vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) 
Eggs removed from the 
ovaries are fertilised 
with sperm in a 
laboratory, and the 
resulting embryos are 
transplanted back to the 
uterus. 
28 and 35 percent $8,000-$15,000 per cycle  
 
$50000 until success or 
$44,000 and $211,940 
(Neumann, Gharib, and 
Weinstein (1994)) 
Yes(20-25% 
chance) 
Gamete 
intrafallopian 
transfer (GIFT) 
Eggs and sperm are 
harvested and mixed 
together in a lab. The 
mixture is surgically 
injected into the 
fallopian tubes so 
fertilisation can happen 
naturally inside the 
body. 
25 to 30 percent $8 000 - $15 000 Yes 
Intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection 
(ICSI) 
A single sperm is 
injected into a single egg 
and the resulting embryo 
is transplanted into the 
uterus. 
35 percent $10,000 - $17,000 per 
cycle 
Yes 
Donor sperm Donated sperm is used 
during an IUI treatment. 
IVF techniques can also 
be carried out using 
donor sperm. 
 20 to 26 percent (when 
used with IVF) 
$200-$3000 per unit of 
semen 
(Yes, if other 
treatment is  used 
together) 
Egg (or embryo) 
donation 
An egg (or embryo) 
donated by another 
woman is mixed with 
sperm and implanted in 
the recipient’s uterus. 
43 percent (when used 
with IVF) 
$4,000 -$5,000 (Yes. 20-25% 
chance) 
Surrogacy Another woman carries a 
couple's embryo, or a 
donor embryo, to term. 
Not Available $15,000- $50,000  
Zygote 
Intrafallopian 
Transfer (ZIFT) 
Similar to GIFT but the 
doctors make sure the 
egg is fertilized before 
implanting it into the 
womb.  
25 to 30 percent $8 000 -$15 000 Yes 
Source:Getting Pregnant (2009)  Sperm Donation, last revised 2009, Retrieved August 20, 2009 from 
http://www.wdxcyber.com/sperm_donation.html 
 
BabyCenter (2009) Fertility treatment: Your options at a glance, last revised 2009, Retrieved August 20, 2009 from  
 http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-your-options-at-a-glance_1228997.bc?page=1 
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Table 2.2: States with mandate coverage
 
State 
Year 
law 
passed 
Mandate to IVF is Law applies to Upper 
age 
limit 
  cover offer included excluded All firms 
Non-
HMOs 
Only 
HMOs 
Arkansas 1987 Y N Y N  N Y N  
California 1989 N Y N Y Y N N  
Connecticut 1989 2005 
onwards 
Before 
2005 Y N N Y N 
Below 
40 
(2005~) 
Hawaii 1987 Y N Y N Y N N  
Illinois 1991 Y N Y N Y N N  
Louisiana 2001 Y N N Y Y N N  
Maryland 1985 Y N Y N Y N N  
Massachusetts 1987 Y N Y N Y N N  
Montana 1987 Y N N Y N N Y  
New York 1990 Y N N Y N Y N 21-44 (2002~) 
New Jersey 2001 Y N Y N Y N N Below 46 
Ohio 1991 Y N Before 1997 
1997 
onwards N N Y  
Rhode Island 1989 Y N Y N Y N N 25-40 (2006~) 
Texas 1987 N Y Y N Y N N  
West Virginia 1977 Y N N Y N N Y  
   Sources: Bitler (2008), Resolve (2008), and The New York Times (2002)  
   Notes: This table presents the states that had implemented the state-level mandates and summarizes the extent of their coverage.  Mandate 
    “to cover” is a type of mandate that requires insurance companies to cover the infertility treatment cost regardless of the insurance policies 
    purchased. On the other hand, mandate “to offer” simply regulates insurance providers to offer infertility insurance policies to customers.    
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Age in the first period 21.65 2.90 21.09 3.05 22.47 3.16 21.90 2.71
Birth (1 if birth observed) 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.18
State-level economic indicators
Median annual income 7033.63 1593.85 6229.25 1646.40 14668.93 3806.48 13440.55 3859.00
Top 10 percentile annual income 17621.79 4195.27 16032.85 4106.10 38772.77 9735.18 35580.74 9585.53
Female labor force participation rate 0.46 0.04 0.46 0.05 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.05
Female unemployment rate 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03
Ethnicity dummies
White 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.88
Black 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.11
Education dummies
Highest grade attended 1-5 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.01
Highest grade attended 6-8 0.001 0.01 0.00 0.01
Highest grade attended 9-12 0.43 0.47 0.30 0.39
Highest grade attended 13 or more 0.56 0.52 0.70 0.59
Region of Residence dummies
New England 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.02
Mid-atlantic 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23
Mid-west 0.27 0.37 0.21 0.26
South Atlantic 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.22
East South 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09
West South 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03
Mountain 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08
Pacific 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.07
Starting year dummies
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1970/1980 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.34
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1971/1981 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1972/1982 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1973/1983 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1974/1984 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1975/1985 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1976/1986 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.06
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1977/1987 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1978/1988 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1979/1989 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1980/1990 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1991 0.01 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1992 0.02 0.03
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1993 0.02 0.03
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1994 0.02 0.02
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1995 0.01 0.02
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1996 0.01 0.01
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1997 0.01 0.01
Year dummies
1 if observed in 1970/1980 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1971/1981 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1972/1982 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00
1 if observed in 1973/1983 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1974/1984 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1975/1985 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.06
1 if observed in 1976/1986 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1977/1987 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1978/1988 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05
1 if observed in 1979/1989 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1980/1990 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.06
1 if observed in 1991 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1992 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1993 0.07 0.07
1 if observed in 1994 0.07 0.07
1 if observed in 1995 0.05 0.06
1 if observed in 1996 0.06 0.07
1 if observed in 1997 0.04 0.05
Number of observations 2103 3552 3997 6832
Number of individuals 586 1015 1001 1684
Note: This table reports the averages and standard deviations of variables taking account of the survey data structure of PSID. Treatment group includes women who were
residing in states that introduced mandates sometime during the observation period. The first two columns report the summary statistics of variables from the pre-policy
period data (i.e.1970-1980) while the third and fourth columns show that of the post-policy period data (i.e. 1980-1997).
1980-1997
Control ControlTreatment
1970-1980
Treatment
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Table 2.4: Estimates of mandates effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women
10≤Education≤12
All race All race All race
Mandate (Policy×After) 0.03 0.30* -0.38** -0.54**
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
Policy 0.14 0.12 0.16
(0.42) (0.33) (0.46)
LR test of gamma variance 12.40*** 2.28* 1.60
Number of women observed 2685 1339 1180
Observations 10829 4794 4925
Notes: This table displays key policy impact variables from discrete-time proportional hazard estimates with 
heterogeneity. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The dependent variable is
a dummy which equals one if birth observed  in a piece-wise constant baseline hazard and  gamma unobserved  
particular year and 0 otherwise. The estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in Table 9
in the appendix. Covariates included are: age of individuals in the first year of observation and its squared 
term, race, education and region of residence dummies, state-level characteristics,  year fixed effects and start 
year dummies. The flexible baseline hazard is assumed to be common between the treatment and control groups. 
Column (1) shows  regression results when all women in the sample are included.
Column (2) shows results estimated using a sample of women with 10 to 12 years of education. 
Column (3) shows results for women with more than 13 years of education  
Column (4) shows results for white women with more than 13 years of education.
Standard errors are bootstrapped  to take account of state-level clustering and are shown in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
White
839
15.30***
3662
13≤Education
By education
(0.61)
(0.22)
0.08
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Table 2.5: Estimated baseline hazard
 Periods (t) Coefficients  Periods(t) Coefficients
Mandate_period1 -0.58
(0.46)
period2 0.06 Mandate_period2 -0.55***
(0.13) (0.20)
period3 0.32* Mandate_period3 -0.42
(0.18) (0.36)
period4 0.40* Mandate_period4 -0.87***
(0.23) (0.31)
period5 0.55* Mandate_period5 -0.73
(0.30) (0.48)
period6/7 0.25 Mandate_period6/7 0.14
(0.33) (0.27)
period8/9 0.27 Mandate_period8/9 0.19
(0.44) (0.39)
period10/11 0.20 Mandate_period10/11 -0.07
(0.57) (0.23)
period12/15 -0.16 Mandate_period12/15 -0.02
(0.63) (0.37)
Notes: This table displays the baseline hazard estimates from discrete-time proportional
hazard model with piece-wise constant baseline hazard and gamma unobserved
heterogeneity. The first column shows the piece-wise constant baseline hazard for the
unaffected individuals whereas the second column includes the difference in hazard between
the affected and unaffected individuals. Number of individuals in the sample is 1180
contributing binary responses of 4925. LR test of gamma variance reports a chi squared
statistics of 1.713*. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The
dependent variable is a dummy which equals one if birth observed and 0 otherwise. The
estimates for the covariates are included in Table 9 in the appendix. Standard errors are
bootstrapped to take account of the state-level clustering and are reported in parentheses.
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ***
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Table 2.6: Policy impacts by differential coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cover vs Offer IVF vs no IVF
All firms vs Not 
all firms
IVF vs no IVF 
(excluding New 
York)
all firms ( 
excluding New 
York)
Mandate_Cover -0.43*
(0.26)
Mandate_Offer -0.33
(0.21)
Policy_Cover 0.1
(0.47)
Policy_Offer 0.41
(0.73)
Mandate_IVF covered -0.18* -0.18*
(0.11) (0.11)
Mandate_IVF not covered -0.71 -0.35
(0.44) (0.29)
Policy_IVF covered -0.01 -0.02
(0.50) (0.17)
Policy_IVF not covered 0.47 0.22
(0.68) (0.28)
Mandate_All insurance firms -0.13 -0.12
(0.15) (0.12)
Mandate_Not all insurance firms -1.01** -0.67**
(0.40) (0.31)
Policy_All insurance firms 0.09 0.04
(0.44) (0.20)
Policy_Not all insurance firms 0.31 0.01
(0.62) (0.32)
LR test of gamma variance 3.60** 1.53 3.55** 1.34 2.51*
Number of women observed 1180 1180 1180 1110 1110
Observations 4925 4925 4925 4635 4635
Notes: This table displays key policy impact variables estimated separately by the characteristics of the mandate. 
These results were estimated using the dicrete-time proportional hazard model with piece-wise constant baseline hazard
 and gamma unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals to one if birth observed 0 otherwise.  
The estimates for theh baseline hazard and covariates are included in the appendix (Table 9)
Highly educated women only
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Table 2.8: Test for the assumptions regarding the sampling scheme
 Periods (t) Coefficients  Periods(t) Coefficients
Mandate_period1 -0.51
(0.507)
period2 -0.27 Mandate_period2 -0.99***
(0.180) (0.343)
period3 0.13 Mandate_period3 0.15
(0.181) (0.254)
period4 0.53** Mandate_period4 -0.66*
(0.245) (0.399)
period5 1.15*** Mandate_period5 -1.15***
(0.245) (0.402)
period6/7 1.42*** Mandate_period6/7 -0.17
(0.314) (0.268)
period8/9 1.98*** Mandate_period8/9 0.11
(0.449) (0.340)
period10/11 2.48*** Mandate_period10/11 0.73**
(0.644) (0.306)
period12/15 2.97*** Mandate_period12/15 -0.14
(0.794) (0.413)
Notes: This table shows results estimated by using a sample of women who were 20 in the
initial period. The first column shows the piece-wise constant baseline hazard for the
unaffected individuals whereas the second column includes the difference in hazard between
the affected and unaffected individuals. LR test of gamma variance reports a chi squared
statistics of 10.82***. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
The dependent variable is a dummy which equals one if birth observed and 0 otherwise. The
estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in Table 9 in the appendix.
Number of individuals in the sample is 1101 contributing binary responses of 4125.
Standard errors are bootstrapped to take account of the state-level clustering and are
reported in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ***
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Conclusions
This thesis presents empirical evidence on how financial incentives affect the
timing of birth.
The first chapter looks at the effect of the UK WFTC policy on the timing of
first and subsequent birth using a multiple-spell discrete-time proportional hazard
model with normal unobserved heterogeneity. The policy impact is identified using
a difference-in-differences estimator and by comparing the timing of birth of women
with different levels of educational attainment. The main data employed in the
analysis is the 1991-2003 BHPS.
The findings from this chapter suggest that apart from the first birth, second and
third birth timings were only insignificantly shortened, suggesting limited impacts
of WFTC and other pronatalist benefits. The significant observed delay of the first
birth, which suggests a delay of approximately 1.7 years, is likely to be due the
following reasons. Firstly, WFTC may have been less effective as the marginal cost
of having a first child is likely to be higher than that of the subsequent births. In
fact, women with partners with at least one child responded positively by shortening
the timing of birth, albeit insignificantly. Secondly, other labour market policies that
were introduced during this period of time seem to have particularly affected the
childless women’s labour supply. Such an increase in the female labour supply is
likely to have deterred women from entering motherhood.
The second chapter investigates the impact of the US infertility state mandates
on the timing of first birth. A discrete-time proportional hazard model is estimated
allowing for a flexible nonparametric baseline hazard as well as gamma unobserved
heterogeneity. By employing the 1980-1997 PSID, this chapter identifies the impact
of the mandates by a difference-in-differences estimator and exploiting the variation
in the cost of infertility treatment across states and years.
Results indicate no delaying of birth when the entire sample of women is used,
but significant delaying effect is found among the highly educated individuals with
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more than 13 years of education. The size of delay depended on the age at which
these women became exposed to the mandates. For example, at the median of the
survival function, affected white women are estimated to have delayed their first
birth for 1 year if they were exposed to the legislation for two years by the age of
20 or 25. The size of delay becomes even larger when they were affected at the age
of 30. In particular, these women are observed to have delayed their first birth for
2 years. The estimated policy impact translates to approximately 14% increase in
the number of women who face infertility. This implies an increase of approximately
0.37 million infertile women.
Although it is not easy to summarise these findings from the two very different
policies that affected different demographic groups of women, the evidence from
this thesis suggests the existence of unintended consequences of these policies. In
addition, the larger impact found in the second chapter seems to reconfirm the
importance of female labour supply in determining women’s fertility behaviour. The
women affected by the UK WFTC and the other policies during this period were
encouraged to increase their labour supply. This is likely to have made it difficult
for women to balance work and life. On the other hand, the US women faced fewer
dilemmas as a result of the mandates. By relaxing the biological constraints, the
mandates are likely to have made it easier for women to pursue their careers. The
future labour market policy planning as well as the empirical analysis of female
labour supply, therefore, must take into consideration the potential unintended side
effects on fertility. Moreover, an effective fertility related policy must combine the
reduction in the tension women face between work and life.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Chapter1: All estimates from Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
birth birth birth birth birth birth birth
Piecewise constant baseline hazard
Spell1
  period1 1.24*** 1.09** 0.38 1.25*** 1.00***
(0.205) (0.426) (0.267) (0.208) (0.204)
  period2 1.26*** 1.34*** 0.52* 1.27*** 1.09***
(0.215) (0.421) (0.273) (0.217) (0.211)
  period3 1.66*** 1.59*** 0.85*** 1.68*** 1.47***
(0.217) (0.418) (0.279) (0.220) (0.213)
  period4 1.69*** 1.76*** 0.82*** 1.71*** 1.43***
(0.229) (0.418) (0.296) (0.232) (0.228)
  period5 1.58*** 1.87*** 0.74** 1.60*** 1.28***
(0.245) (0.421) (0.315) (0.247) (0.246)
  period6 1.90*** 1.93*** 1.07*** 1.94*** 1.65***
(0.248) (0.427) (0.320) (0.251) (0.247)
  period7 2.17*** 1.91*** 1.42*** 2.21*** 1.88***
(0.254) (0.439) (0.327) (0.257) (0.254)
  period8 2.34*** 1.86*** 1.46*** 2.36*** 2.09***
(0.266) (0.455) (0.348) (0.268) (0.265)
  period9 2.49*** 1.71*** 2.51*** 2.15***
(0.281) (0.479) (0.284) (0.286)
  period10 2.45*** 1.61*** 2.47*** 2.11***
(0.305) (0.508) (0.309) (0.312)
  period11 2.66*** 2.68*** 2.44***
(0.317) (0.321) (0.319)
  period12 2.86*** 2.86*** 2.59***
(0.333) (0.338) (0.334)
  period11_12 1.09**
(0.519)
  period13_15 0.24
(0.639)
  period13 2.49*** 2.51*** 2.36***
(0.392) (0.396) (0.391)
  period14 2.42*** 2.40*** 2.25***
(0.434) (0.441) (0.433)
  period15_16 2.07*** 2.08*** 1.98***
(0.437) (0.441) (0.450)
  period17_19 1.27** 1.30** 1.06*
(0.605) (0.607) (0.607)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.3, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (1).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (2).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (3).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (1).
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (2).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (3)
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
birth birth birth birth birth birth birth
Spell 2
  period1 1.81*** 0.80* 1.43*** 1.74*** 1.67***
(0.226) (0.452) (0.304) (0.235) (0.222)
  period2 2.91*** 2.31*** 2.46*** 2.86*** 2.74***
(0.222) (0.412) (0.309) (0.230) (0.216)
  period3 3.65*** 2.72*** 2.95*** 3.59*** 3.44***
(0.240) (0.408) (0.336) (0.247) (0.236)
  period4 3.45*** 2.47*** 2.89*** 3.42*** 3.21***
(0.284) (0.426) (0.395) (0.291) (0.284)
  period5 3.99*** 2.48*** 2.89*** 4.01*** 3.76***
(0.313) (0.442) (0.463) (0.320) (0.312)
  period6 3.50*** 3.34*** 3.06***
(0.426) (0.428) (0.437)
  period7 4.50*** 4.37*** 4.04***
(0.417) (0.425) (0.434)
  period6_7 1.58*** 2.85***
(0.486) (0.493)
  period8_9 0.25 3.83***
(0.803) (0.694)
  period8_10 4.38*** 4.41*** 4.03***
(0.513) (0.515) (0.500)
  period11_17 4.51*** 4.42*** 4.02***
(0.804) (0.806) (0.773)
 Spell 3
  period1 0.91** 1.01* -0.11 0.62 0.84**
(0.371) (0.541) (0.608) (0.403) (0.368)
  period2 1.67*** 1.51*** 0.74 1.38*** 1.46***
(0.346) (0.519) (0.569) (0.379) (0.346)
  period3 2.07*** 0.76 1.00* 1.78*** 1.84***
(0.357) (0.654) (0.590) (0.390) (0.358)
  period4 2.15*** 0.98 0.85 1.96*** 1.98***
(0.393) (0.659) (0.648) (0.418) (0.390)
  period5_6 2.37*** 0.80 2.13*** 2.09***
(0.386) (0.638) (0.417) (0.382)
period5_8_spell3 0.03
(0.664)
  period7_8 2.57*** 1.37* 2.19*** 2.59***
(0.554) (0.786) (0.585) (0.533)
  period9_12 2.23*** 1.86** 2.03***
(0.709) (0.733) (0.709)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.3, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (1).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (2).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (3).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (1).
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (2).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (3)
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
birth birth birth birth birth birth birth
Quadratic baseline hazard
  period×spell1 0.18
(0.245)
  period×period×spell1 -0.01
(0.013)
  period×spell2 -0.05
(0.075)
  period×period×spell2 -0.01
(0.007)
  period×spell3 -0.14
(0.130)
  period×period×spell3 -0.01
Race
  White -1.61*** 0.50 -0.42 -0.68*** -2.11*** -1.60*** -1.62***
(0.147) (0.636) (0.573) (0.262) (0.188) (0.150) (0.140)
  Black -0.75 2.02 -0.80 -0.10 -1.31** -0.77 -0.66
(0.573) (1.411) (0.704) (0.705) (0.590) (0.582) (0.533)
Housing tenure
  Owned -0.54*** -0.49 0.03 0.17 -0.56** -0.53*** -0.51***
(0.183) (0.574) (0.305) (0.212) (0.235) (0.183) (0.181)
  Rented 0.39*** 1.52*** -0.32** 0.08 0.56*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.096) (0.507) (0.125) (0.136) (0.113) (0.097) (0.095)
Region of residence
  North West -1.94*** -1.80 -0.31 0.34 -1.49*** -1.95*** -1.82***
(0.209) (1.216) (0.310) (0.265) (0.231) (0.211) (0.202)
  Yorkshire -1.99*** -3.09** -0.52 0.26 -1.27*** -2.01*** -1.92***
(0.232) (1.323) (0.328) (0.273) (0.246) (0.235) (0.226)
  East Midlands -1.76*** -1.75 -0.05 0.02 -1.11*** -1.79*** -1.66***
(0.231) (1.238) (0.338) (0.312) (0.243) (0.233) (0.222)
  West Midlands -1.95*** -3.85** -0.40 0.17 -1.48*** -1.95*** -1.90***
(0.233) (1.526) (0.337) (0.287) (0.243) (0.236) (0.224)
  East of England -2.17*** -0.62 -0.17 -0.79** -1.79*** -2.22*** -2.05***
(0.233) (1.061) (0.312) (0.325) (0.274) (0.236) (0.226)
  London -2.81*** -1.77* 0.75** -0.04 -2.37*** -2.83*** -2.75***
(0.245) (1.006) (0.332) (0.295) (0.307) (0.248) (0.245)
  South East -2.38*** -2.13* -0.30 0.02 -1.85*** -2.39*** -2.31***
(0.213) (1.138) (0.300) (0.266) (0.241) (0.215) (0.208)
  South West -1.84*** -1.28 -0.12 0.28 -1.33*** -1.83*** -1.74***
(0.233) (1.074) (0.354) (0.285) (0.252) (0.235) (0.224)
  Wales -1.75*** -1.61 -0.25 0.32 -1.04*** -1.77*** -1.66***
(0.222) (0.990) (0.315) (0.269) (0.247) (0.225) (0.214)
  Scotland -2.10*** -1.65* -0.25 0.24 -1.43*** -2.10*** -1.94***
(0.208) (0.958) (0.301) (0.250) (0.231) (0.210) (0.202)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.3, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (1).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (2).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (3).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (1).
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (2).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (3)
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
birth birth birth birth birth birth birth
Starting year dummies
  start86 -1.03*** -1.84 -0.70 -0.52** -0.35* -1.05*** -0.83***
(0.236) (1.281) (0.480) (0.254) (0.201) (0.239) (0.216)
  start87 -1.53*** -3.58** 0.07 -0.34 -0.95*** -1.58*** -1.37***
(0.242) (1.539) (0.323) (0.258) (0.224) (0.246) (0.224)
  start88 -1.51*** -6.74*** 0.13 -0.22 -0.82*** -1.56*** -1.32***
(0.261) (2.596) (0.262) (0.248) (0.241) (0.265) (0.243)
  start89 -1.42*** -0.34 0.43* -0.55 -0.89*** -1.46*** -1.17***
(0.262) (2.160) (0.253) (0.366) (0.257) (0.266) (0.242)
  start90 -1.60*** -1.49 -0.12 -0.45* -1.31*** -1.70*** -1.42***
(0.257) (1.206) (0.272) (0.263) (0.271) (0.262) (0.241)
  start91 -1.40*** -3.34** 0.25 -0.56** -1.04*** -1.49*** -1.29***
(0.248) (1.702) (0.262) (0.273) (0.261) (0.253) (0.233)
  start92 -1.47*** -3.67** -0.28 -0.48* -1.09*** -1.56*** -1.25***
(0.252) (1.529) (0.272) (0.287) (0.269) (0.256) (0.235)
  start93 -1.62*** -2.53** 0.11 -0.61** -1.14*** -1.72*** -1.42***
(0.266) (1.252) (0.331) (0.256) (0.299) (0.271) (0.252)
  start94 -1.79*** -3.65** -0.05 -0.67** -1.13*** -1.90*** -1.47***
(0.285) (1.593) (0.294) (0.270) (0.322) (0.290) (0.267)
  start95 -1.70*** -3.04** -0.37 -0.69*** -1.18*** -1.82*** -1.47***
(0.279) (1.442) (0.399) (0.261) (0.334) (0.285) (0.266)
  start96 -1.90*** -4.84*** 0.04 -0.77** -1.71*** -2.00*** -1.77***
(0.294) (1.720) (0.327) (0.304) (0.417) (0.300) (0.285)
  start97 -2.24*** -4.21*** 0.07 -0.64** -0.89** -2.35*** -1.89***
(0.297) (1.581) (0.321) (0.272) (0.356) (0.303) (0.282)
  start98 -2.73*** -5.31*** -0.09 -0.64** -2.52*** -2.84*** -2.27***
(0.340) (1.733) (0.377) (0.280) (0.673) (0.347) (0.322)
  start99 -2.36*** -4.06*** 0.33 -0.54* -2.43*** -2.18***
(0.322) (1.466) (0.442) (0.316) (0.322) (0.327)
  start2000 -2.76*** -5.20*** -0.28 -0.59* -2.84*** -2.37***
(0.380) (1.723) (0.444) (0.313) (0.380) (0.363)
  start2001 -2.70*** -4.61*** 0.94** -1.23*** -2.78*** -2.32***
(0.406) (1.648) (0.422) (0.397) (0.406) (0.388)
  start2002 -2.54*** -3.71*** 0.14 -0.49 -2.62*** -2.14***
(0.433) (1.425) (0.494) (0.379) (0.433) (0.419)
  start2003 -3.28*** -5.04*** -0.15 -0.21 -3.37*** -2.77***
(0.612) (1.818) (0.570) (0.400) (0.612) (0.596)
(0.014)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.3, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (1).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (2).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (3).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (1).
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (2).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (3)
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
birth birth birth birth birth birth birth
Age in the initial 
period 0.00 -0.23***
(0.050) (0.041)
Age in the initial 
period squared -0.00 0.00***
(0.001) (0.001)
Treatment1×Age in 
the initial period -0.32*** 0.48***
(0.078) (0.188)
Treatment1×Age in 
the initial period 
squared 0.00*** -0.01***
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.48*** 1.65** -12.85 -0.54* -0.21 0.53*** 0.22
(0.161) (0.714) (22.631) (0.315) (0.264) (0.157) (0.180)
Observations 13,766 2,064 2,886 6,616 7,020 13,766 12,713
Number of women 1,486 433 356 831 1,043 1,486 1,486
LR test of 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 172.3*** 13.78*** 9.68e-05 16.48*** 36.45*** 181.6*** 125.7***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.3, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (1).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (2).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.4, column (3).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (1).
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (2).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.5, column (3)
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Table A.2: Chapter1: All estimates from Tables 1.6
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Age 0.33*** 0.15*** -0.02
(0.017) (0.054) (0.060)
Age squared -0.01*** -0.00** 0.00
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age cubed 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Race
  White 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
  Black 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.07***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.022)
Housing tenure
  Owned -2.45*** -1.35** 0.12
(0.150) (0.529) (0.605)
  Rented/own -2.62*** -1.59*** -0.16
(0.150) (0.528) (0.605)
  Rent -2.66*** -1.63*** -0.14
(0.150) (0.528) (0.605)
Region of residence
  York -0.02* 0.00 0.03***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
  Northwest -0.02** 0.01 0.02
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
  East Midlands 0.01 -0.02 0.04***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
  West Midlands -0.00 0.00 0.03***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
  East Anglia 0.03*** 0.01 0.02
(0.012) (0.020) (0.017)
  London 0.02** -0.09*** -0.08***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
  South East 0.03*** -0.02 0.00
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
  South West 0.02** -0.03* 0.04***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
  Wales -0.05*** -0.03** 0.01
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015)
  Scotland -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 37,086 20,398 25,879
R-squared 0.833 0.631 0.638
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 1.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.6, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.6, column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 1.6, column (3).
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Table A.3: Chapter2: All estimates from Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Period
   Period 2 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.28** 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.12
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10)
   Period 3 0.23 -0.01 0.36* 0.94*** 0.45** 0.33* 0.43** 0.32 0.39**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18)
   Period 4 0.38 0.19 0.38 1.08*** 0.51* 0.35 0.49* 0.31 0.42
(0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.32) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31)
   Period 5 0.43 0.01 0.55 1.71*** 0.72** 0.50 0.69** 0.50 0.64**
(0.30) (0.29) (0.39) (0.43) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.35) (0.30)
   Period 6 0.44 0.22 0.18 1.37*** 0.39 0.13 0.36 0.12 0.30
(0.35) (0.38) (0.44) (0.50) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.43) (0.45)
   Period 7 0.71* 0.31 0.70 1.52*** 0.94** 0.65 0.90** 0.65 0.84
(0.40) (0.48) (0.50) (0.57) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41) (0.46) (0.54)
   Period 8 0.75 0.49 0.42 1.64** 0.69 0.37 0.67 0.39 0.62
(0.48) (0.49) (0.61) (0.66) (0.54) (0.53) (0.50) (0.52) (0.60)
   Period 9 0.76 0.27 0.57 2.15*** 0.87 0.51 0.85 0.54 0.80
(0.55) (0.63) (0.65) (0.71) (0.57) (0.54) (0.54) (0.57) (0.49)
   Period 10 0.90 0.47 0.63 2.02** 0.94 0.56 0.92 0.47 0.74
(0.58) (0.59) (0.80) (0.85) (0.71) (0.66) (0.68) (0.61) (0.63)
   Period 11 0.84 0.62 -0.02 1.47* 0.33 -0.09 0.32 -0.04 0.27
(0.68) (0.69) (0.86) (0.83) (0.79) (0.74) (0.75) (0.71) (0.70)
   Period 12 0.91 0.71 0.09 1.79** 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.07 0.38
(0.74) (0.86) (0.96) (0.85) (0.85) (0.75) (0.79) (0.74) (0.70)
   Period 13 1.21 0.30 0.72 2.71*** 1.11 0.64 1.09 0.54 0.89
(0.73) (0.88) (0.89) (0.90) (0.75) (0.69) (0.70) (0.73) (0.74)
   Period 14 -1.57** -1.54 -1.13 -1.62** -1.16 -1.63 -1.27
(0.78) (1.03) (0.85) (0.82) (3.44) (1.20) (0.85)
   Period 15 0.63 -0.22 0.19 -0.30 0.18 -0.28 0.10
(0.87) (1.14) (1.00) (3.17) (0.96) (0.97) (1.09)
   Period 17 -0.00
(0.94)
   Period 18
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1). Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2). Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3). Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4). Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Education dummies
   Highest grade attended 6-8 3.46
(4.44)
   Highest grade attended 9-12 3.26
(4.40)
   Highest grade attended 13 or more 2.84
(4.41)
Ethnicity dummies
   White -0.16 0.05 -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.50** -0.49***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13)
Age in the first year of observation 1.68*** 1.45*** 1.88*** 2.26*** 1.89*** 1.94*** 1.88*** 1.92*** 1.92*** 1.87***
(0.16) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.32)
Age in the first year of observation squared -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Region of Residence dummies
   Mid-atlantic 0.17 0.19 0.03 -0.23 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.08 -0.15 -0.17
(0.58) (2.43) (0.64) (0.69) (0.65) (0.66) (0.71) (0.69) (0.89) (0.31)
   Mid-west 0.20 0.17 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.07
(0.40) (2.33) (0.54) (0.55) (0.52) (0.57) (0.58) (0.60) (0.33) (0.23)
   South Atlantic 0.19 0.17 -0.01 -0.26 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.10
(0.48) (2.37) (0.60) (0.60) (0.57) (0.50) (0.68) (0.61) (0.57) (0.24)
   East South 0.34 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.03
(0.61) (2.28) (0.71) (0.84) (0.71) (0.71) (0.80) (0.74) (0.76) (0.31)
   West South 0.29 0.32 0.03 0.35 -0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.10 0.06 -0.03
(0.52) (2.32) (0.61) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.70) (0.68) (0.81) (0.27)
   Mountain 0.60 0.38 0.49 0.77 0.46 0.52 0.37 0.55 0.49 0.38
(0.60) (2.38) (0.73) (0.70) (0.68) (0.72) (0.75) (0.77) (0.61) (0.33)
   Pacific 0.14 -0.15 0.12 0.06 0.11 -0.08 -0.13 0.17 0.14 -0.03
(0.76) (2.30) (0.69) (0.76) (0.68) (0.82) (0.86) (0.77) (0.94) (0.32)
State-level Economics Indicators
   Median annual income -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
   Top 10 percentile annual income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
   Female labor force participation rate 0.62 2.24 0.26 -2.92 0.36 -0.30 0.29 0.08 0.21 0.78
(2.73) (2.74) (2.99) (3.80) (2.90) (3.01) (3.19) (2.96) (3.10) (1.67)
   Female unemployment rate 3.82 3.87 5.77** 11.33*** 6.01** 6.21** 6.14*** 5.53** 5.84* 6.19**
(2.47) (3.39) (2.50) (3.46) (2.56) (2.48) (2.34) (2.35) (3.07) (2.73)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1). Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2). Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3). Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4). Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Starting year dummies
   start81 0.49*** 0.57*** 0.42** 0.03 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.63* 0.49**
(0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.24) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.33) (0.22)
   start82 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.89*** 0.62*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.72*** 0.37 0.68**
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.29) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.32) (0.27)
   start83 0.65*** 0.57** 0.61*** 0.80** 0.57*** 0.67*** 0.59*** 0.65*** 0.30 0.59**
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.36) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.30) (0.30)
   start84 0.72*** 0.85*** 0.61** 0.40 0.55** 0.69*** 0.59** 0.69*** 0.33 0.56*
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.41) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.30)
   start85 0.39 0.17 0.67* 0.62 0.56** 0.73*** 0.66** 0.72*** -0.52 0.80***
(0.30) (0.34) (0.37) (0.39) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.40) (0.29)
   start86 0.66* 0.25 1.15*** 1.58*** 1.04*** 1.28*** 1.17*** 1.27*** -0.22 1.09***
(0.35) (0.39) (0.38) (0.48) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.35) (0.32)
   start87 0.49 0.52 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.34 0.40
(0.41) (0.47) (0.49) (0.53) (0.34) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.31)
   start88 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.17 0.57 0.77* 0.68 0.80* -0.00 0.63*
(0.48) (0.47) (0.54) (0.51) (0.37) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42) (0.33)
   start89 0.69 0.90 0.49 0.54 0.47 0.61 0.52 0.62 0.12 0.56*
(0.48) (0.57) (0.60) (0.58) (0.36) (0.44) (0.43) (0.40) (0.47) (0.31)
   start90 1.38** 1.40** 0.96 1.16** 0.95** 1.13** 0.95* 1.16** 0.09 0.98***
(0.60) (0.62) (0.66) (0.58) (0.44) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.52) (0.34)
   start91 0.83 1.18* 0.58 0.25 0.63 0.71 0.59 0.70 -0.25 0.55
(0.58) (0.61) (0.66) (0.68) (0.44) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.57) (0.35)
   start92 1.15* 1.03 1.00 1.15 1.04** 1.19** 1.03** 1.24** -0.31 1.07***
(0.64) (0.65) (0.74) (0.73) (0.44) (0.54) (0.52) (0.48) (0.60) (0.38)
   start93 0.88 1.42** 0.59 0.28 0.69 0.75 0.62 0.79 -0.12 0.61*
(0.71) (0.72) (0.81) (0.78) (0.48) (0.58) (0.58) (0.52) (0.64) (0.34)
   start94 0.52 0.90 -0.05 -0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.12 -0.70 -0.03
(0.81) (0.79) (0.87) (0.79) (0.55) (0.62) (0.62) (0.56) (0.72) (0.39)
   start95 0.85 1.18 0.51 0.37 0.63 0.70 0.56 0.75 -0.16 0.55
(0.80) (0.78) (0.99) (0.94) (0.59) (0.74) (0.74) (0.67) (0.75) (0.42)
   start96 0.52 0.53 0.27 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.33 0.43 0.26
(0.86) (0.85) (1.03) (0.93) (0.57) (0.75) (0.69) (0.67) (0.48)
   start97 0.22 0.59 -0.37 -1.23
(0.95) (0.87) (1.08) (3.58)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Year fixed effects
   year1981 -0.10 -0.03 -0.31* -0.13 -0.30* -0.30** -0.30* -0.30* -0.30 -0.31*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17)
   year1982 -0.16 -0.10 -0.40* -0.81*** -0.37* -0.41** -0.39** -0.39* -0.45* -0.45***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.26) (0.14)
   year1983 -0.01 0.16 -0.37* -0.74*** -0.37* -0.39** -0.37* -0.37* -0.36 -0.36*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.27) (0.21)
   year1984 -0.10 0.16 -0.56** -0.89*** -0.54** -0.57*** -0.54** -0.57** -0.50* -0.52**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (0.21)
   year1985 -0.04 0.26 -0.54*** -1.03*** -0.52** -0.56*** -0.52*** -0.56*** -0.45 -0.47*
(0.18) (0.25) (0.21) (0.32) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.25)
   year1986 0.28* 0.55*** -0.39 -0.72* -0.19 -0.41* -0.36 -0.41* -0.60** -0.63
(0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.40) (0.27) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.41)
   year1987 0.35*** 0.63*** -0.24 -0.42** -0.11 -0.26* -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.26
(0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.26)
   year1988 0.46*** 0.68*** 0.07 -0.29 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.06
(0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.28) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.24) (0.29)
   year1989 0.48*** 0.58*** 0.24* 0.04 0.40*** 0.23* 0.23* 0.18 0.21 0.18
(0.07) (0.21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.21)
   year1991 0.32*** 0.37** 0.15 -0.06 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.06
(0.09) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.24)
   year1992 0.35*** 0.32** 0.01 -0.28* 0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12
(0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.23)
   year1993 0.18* 0.11 0.08 -0.38* 0.23* 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19)
   year1994 0.39*** 0.29 0.34*** 0.22* 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.31 0.29*
(0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.15)
   year1995 0.01 0.25 -0.40*** -0.51*** -0.38** -0.39** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.47* -0.48**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.19)
   year1996 0.19* 0.11 0.21 -0.03 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13
(0.11) (0.23) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.25)
Constant -26.56*** -20.81*** -25.86*** -30.67*** -25.91*** -26.35*** -25.77*** -26.25***  -25.84*** -26.15***
(4.59) (3.69) (2.78) (4.01) (3.24) (2.94) (3.05) (3.21) (0.93) (3.60)
LR test of gamma variance12.40*** 1.60 2.276* 15.30*** 1.713* 3.60** 1.53 3.55** 1.34 0.59
Observations 10829 4794 4925 4925 4925 4925 4925 4925 4635 4635
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
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Table A.4: Chapter2: All estimates from Tables 2.7 and 2.8
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Period
   Period 2 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.09
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
   Period 3 0.43* 0.37 0.40* 0.66***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21)
   Period 4 0.43 0.34 0.38 0.77***
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.28)
   Period 5 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.62*
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.35)
   Period 6 0.52 0.38 0.45 1.07***
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.40)
   Period 7 0.44 0.27 0.35 1.08**
(0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.48)
   Period 8 0.35 0.15 0.24 1.08**
(0.65) (0.64) (0.65) (0.55)
   Period 9 0.00 -0.21 -0.12 0.86
(0.76) (0.75) (0.76) (0.64)
   Period 10 0.40 0.16 0.26 1.34**
(0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.68)
   Period 11 -1.93 -2.19* -2.10 -0.89
(1.31) (1.31) (1.32) (1.21)
   Period 12 -0.67 -0.94 -0.84 0.45
(1.07) (1.06) (1.08) (0.93)
   Period 13 -1.64 -1.92 -1.83 -0.45
(1.38) (1.37) (1.39) (1.27)
   Period 14 -1.52 -1.81 -1.71 -0.28
(1.41) (1.40) (1.42) (1.29)
   Period 15 -1.35 -1.67 -1.55 -0.06
(1.44) (1.43) (1.44) (1.31)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Ethnicity dummies
   White -0.39** -0.37** -0.38** -0.53*** -0.99***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.261)
Age in the first year of observation 2.41*** 2.32*** 2.37*** 2.68***
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Age in the first year of observation squared -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Region of Residence dummies
   Mid-atlantic 0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.09 -0.19
(0.34) (0.33) (0.38) (0.38) (0.935)
   Mid-west 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.28
(0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.34) (0.822)
   South Atlantic -0.16 -0.17 -0.24 -0.15 0.32
(0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.36) (0.874)
   East South 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.55 0.90
(0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.45) (1.027)
   West South 0.63* 0.74** 0.60* 0.69* 1.11
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.39) (0.996)
   Mountain 0.76* 0.74* 0.67 0.87* 0.60
(0.42) (0.41) (0.43) (0.46) (0.873)
   Pacific 0.25 0.42 0.04 0.37 0.55
(0.32) (0.35) (0.40) (0.36) (1.019)
State-level Economics Indicators
   Median annual income -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000)
   Top 10 percentile annual income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000)
   Female labor force participation rate 2.24 2.80 2.25 2.61 0.03
(2.10) (2.10) (2.09) (2.29) (2.211)
   Female unemployment rate 1.35 1.06 1.54 0.84 4.51
(2.65) (2.63) (2.65) (2.75) (3.413)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Starting year dummies
start71 0.60* 0.59* 0.59* 0.65*    start81 -0.56**
(0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.37) (0.252)
start72 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.37    start82 -0.16
(0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.35) (0.353)
start73 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25    start83 -0.31
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.33) (0.411)
start74 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.27    start84 -0.47
(0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.33) (0.317)
start75 -0.67* -0.67* -0.68* -0.63    start85 -0.72*
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.43) (0.426)
start76 -0.45 -0.48 -0.47 -0.32    start86 0.09
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.380)
start77 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.21    start87 -0.90**
(0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.389)
start78 -0.43 -0.49 -0.48 -0.13    start88 -1.04**
(0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.465)
start79 -0.33 -0.41 -0.40 0.02    start89 -0.50
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.475)
start80 -0.34 -0.43 -0.41 0.03    start90 -0.87*
(0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.51) (0.476)
start81 -0.75 -0.79 -0.83 -0.39    start91 -0.15
(0.59) (0.58) (0.59) (0.57) (0.536)
start82 -0.76 -0.82 -0.85 -0.35    start92_94 -0.24
(0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (0.59) (0.590)
start83 -0.57 -0.65 -0.67 -0.12    start95_97 -0.46
(0.67) (0.65) (0.67) (0.63) (0.709)
start84 -1.23* -1.30* -1.34* -0.73
(0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (0.69)
start85 -0.67 -0.78 -0.78 -0.15
(0.77) (0.75) (0.77) (0.72)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Year fixed effects
   year1981 -0.01
(0.344)
   year1982 0.29
(0.358)
   year1983 -0.10
(0.472)
   year1984 -0.17
(0.416)
   year1985 -0.05
(0.423)
   year1986 0.11
(0.371)
   year1987 0.04
(0.260)
   year1988 0.30
(0.309)
   year1989 0.49*
(0.251)
   year1990 0.39
(0.280)
   year1991 0.16
(0.231)
   year1992 0.30
(0.185)
   year1993 0.54***
(0.185)
   year1994 -0.18
(0.166)
   year1995 0.48***
(0.155)
Constant -32.21*** -31.30*** -31.69*** -35.38*** -3.17*
(5.87) (5.90) (5.89) (5.95) (1.703)
LR test of gamma variance47.01*** 46.18*** 46.51*** 55.68*** 10.82***
Observations 4257 4257 4257 4257 4125
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
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